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1. Introduction 
In the present discussion about the role of renewable energies in a future European energy supply 
scheme, certain scenarios envision the exploitation of the substantial North African solar and wind 
energy potentials in order to supply Europe with green electricity. In greater detail, these concepts 
propose the installation of large-scale solar power plants and wind parks as well as an intercontinental 
power grid in order to transport the electricity to Europe. These projects currently enjoy keen attention 
by the European media, particularly since the Desertec Industrial Initiative (Dii), an initiative 
primarily constituted by German companies, has been founded in October 2009. The Dii claims to be 
willing and able to invest a total sum of €400 billion into the construction of future North African 
solar power plants and their connection to the European grid through submarine cables. Parallel to 
that, the political climate in Europe seems to be favourable towards these ideas. Launched already at 
the end of 2008, the new European renewable energy directive allows the import of green electricity 
from non-EU states into the Union. Also, the Union for the Mediterranean, the new political 
instrument of dialogue and cooperation between the EU and non-EU states of the southern and eastern 
Mediterranean, has in its core a large-scale energy partnership programme, the Mediterranean Solar 
Plan. 
In spite of these promising initiatives it needs to be underlined that concepts such as the 
Mediterranean Solar Plan and Desertec are based almost exclusively on largely generalist technical-
economic studies that principally represent the European outlook on these projects. 
When it comes to more detailed, country-specific issues, for instance regarding the related political 
frameworks and economic or legal implications for the different North African export states, a 
thorough investigation is still missing. It is the aim of this study to overcome this deficit by providing 
first insights into the particular situation and position of one North African country, Algeria. Due to its 
geographical situation and strategic position within the energy sector, Algeria is very likely to play a 
key role in a future trans-Mediterranean renewable electricity supply scheme. The study sets out to 
examine the following research questions: 
• How is Algeria regarded by the European proponents of the renewable electricity export 
scenarios? 
• What are the technology options for Algeria to generate renewable electricity and transmit 
it to the European Union? 
• What is the current institutional, legal and regulatory framework for these projects in 
Algeria? 
• What is the position of the relevant Algerian actors? 
• To what extent are renewable electricity exports in line with the strategic development 
goals of the country? 
An interdisciplinary team of both Algerian and European researchers has been set up to examine these 
questions. The main intention of the study is to put the European renewable energy supply initiatives 
that are currently discussed for North Africa into a distinctly “Algerian” context. For that purpose, the 
research group has analysed various country-specific aspects, such as the regulatory framework of the 
Algerian electricity/energy sector, the legal framework for potential investors, tax issues, etc. In 
addition to that, industry and public sector stakeholders have been interviewed in order to obtain a 
clearer picture of the position of the relevant actors.  
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2. Trans-Mediterranean Renewable Electricity Exchange - State of 
Concepts, Research and Support Instruments 
Establishing large-scale electricity projects between North Africa and Europe is not a completely new 
idea: Already in the 1920s Herman Sörgel, a German architect, published construction plans for his 
Atlantropa project, a colossal seawater dam to be placed into the Strait of Gibraltar. Hydroelectric 
generators, driven by the different water levels of the Atlantic and the Mediterranean Sea, would 
supply large amounts of electric power to North Africa and Europe and thereby contribute to the 
welfare of the citizens of both continents (Gall 1998). It is obvious that Sörgel’s utopian plan never 
materialised; from today’s perspective, it would be considered undesirable merely for its unpredictable 
ecological impacts. Nevertheless, Sörgel’s ideas can be honoured as an early commitment to a 
peaceful and cooperative utilisation of natural resources between two neighbouring continents and 
cultures. These ideas need to be seen in the context of politically uniting countries by interlinking their 
infrastructure, such as highways and power grids (Schot/Misa 2005). After the ambitious plans of the 
interwar period had failed dramatically in World War II, they were picked up again in the 
prenegotiations of the Treaties of Rome in the mid-1950s. Again, however, a unified system could not 
materialise. As a consequence, energy policy in terms of power production and in terms of grid 
structures was largely kept out of the early European Communities (Schot/Lagendijk 2008), a decision 
that has kept European energy policy structures inherently national(istic) until the present day.  
The revival of transnational and eventually transcontinental energy exchange structures came about in 
the late 1990s with the rise of renewable energy technologies. At that time, experts started to develop 
concepts of how the exceptionally high wind and solar potentials of North Africa could be integrated 
into a clean electricity supply scheme for Europe. The concepts – which will be described below in 
greater detail – essentially promote the construction of large solar power plants or wind farms, 
combined with the installation of a HVDC (high voltage direct current) grid for the long-distance, 
intercontinental electricity transmission. Today, both the renewable power plant technologies and the 
concept of transcontinental HVDC lines can be considered technologically mature. 
In recent years, these ideas have become the subject of national and international political discussions. 
Noticeably driven by the promising prospects, various industrial and political support initiatives were 
launched to support the realisation of a transcontinental renewable electricity supply scheme. 
Although the evolving process is difficult to monitor due to its rapidly changing nature, this chapter 
attempts to present a brief overview of the current implementation efforts, as well as the status of the 
related scientific research. In accordance with the overall character of the study, special emphasis has 
been put on the Algerian situation. 
2.1. Results from Existing Publications 
It has to be stressed that most of the currently available publications are the product of European 
researchers who had only restricted insights in the political and economic realities of North African 
countries. As a consequence, many of the discussed documents display a noticeable “Western” bias 
due to which the North African countries appear at times to be reduced to mere subjects of 
infrastructure planning. An enhanced participation of research institutes from the South is strongly 
desired in order to avoid similar shortcomings in future research. 
Among the first to address the topic of long-distance renewable electricity transfer are the studies of 
Staiß (1994) and Knies (1999), who proposed extensive solar electricity exports from North Africa to 
Europe through HVDC transmission lines running across the Mediterranean Sea. Kurokawa (2003), in 
his study titled Energy from the Desert, mentions the same possibility, but his focus remains limited 
on photovoltaic (PV) technology. Kurokawa drafted a large PV system with an overall rated power of 
1.5 GW consisting of 300 dispersed 5 MW plants alongside a transmission backbone crossing all 
North African countries from Morocco to Egypt.  
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An early quantitative approach accounting for all renewable technologies (including wind, biomass, 
and geothermal energy) and likewise considering the economics of electricity supply and transmission 
was developed by Czisch (2005). Here, a linear optimisation model was used to simulate a cost-
minimising, 100 percent renewable electricity scheme for Europe and its neighbouring regions. 
Precondition for the feasibility of such a concept is a powerful HVDC transmission system that is 
capable of outbalancing the fluctuating wind and solar power generation over distant regions and the 
availability of large hydro storage facilities, for example in Northern Europe. The overall simulated 
supply area encompasses 19 subregions, each of which features its specific renewable electricity 
generation and demand pattern. Regions with a power surplus due to high renewable energy potentials 
will transfer electricity to regions where demand is higher than production, or where storage capacities 
are available. Algeria as a country is merged into a supply area together with Morocco and the 
Western Sahara territories in the study (see Fig. 2-1). The levelised electricity cost of CSP electricity 
for this region amounts to 10.6 €cents/kWh while wind generation ranges between 3.8 and 6.6 
€cents/kWh. Due to the cheaper generation costs, the Moroccan wind potential alongside the Atlantic 
coast dominates the electricity generation of this supply area amounting to 159 GW capacity and an 
annual production of 495 TWh. Solar energy, the main renewable energy asset of Algeria, therefore 
contributes only to a smaller extent (5 GW capacity and 53 TWh production, mostly CSP technology). 
However, the study does not show which amount of solar electricity is produced in Algeria and which 
in Morocco. With the predominance of Moroccan wind generation, it is a necessary conclusion of the 
model that the bulk of the electricity is exported via a powerful HVDC line across the Strait of 
Gibraltar with a capacity of 139 GW; a smaller HVDC branch from Algeria to Tunisia has only a 
minor capacity of 8 GW. 
 
Fig. 2-1. HVDC supply network. Czisch 2005. 
In DLR (2005) – the so-called MED-CSP study – a more thorough, country-focused analysis of the 
renewable electricity potential in North Africa can be found. The study was compiled by the German 
Aerospace Center with partners in the MENA region (in Algeria this was NEAL). Contrary to Czisch’s 
approach, which consisted of finding a renewable generation optimum for a large intercontinental 
supply scheme, the MED-CSP study took the specific renewable energy potentials of the various 
Mediterranean countries as a starting point of the investigation. For Algeria, the analysis stated a 
theoretical CSP potential of around 170,000 TWh/y (the current national electricity demand is 35 
TWh/y), proving that the country could easily become self-sufficient with renewable energies. The 
study also drafted a roadmap for a supply situation until 2050, where more than 80 percent of 
Algeria’s electricity demand is covered by renewable energies. As Fig. 2-2 shows, in 2050, most of 
the renewable supply would be covered by CSP plants. In the scenario, a total capacity of 30 GW and 
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an annual production of 166 TWh is featured. Wind farms, biomass and photovoltaic plants would 
only contribute to the overall power generation in a minor way. The MED-CSP study – as its title 
indicates – shows a strong focus on CSP technology, which the authors justify by the low levelised 
electricity cost (LEC) that would be obtained through technology innovation and economies of scale 
once the technology reaches mass production. In DLR’s scenario for Algeria, the levelised electricity 
costs of CSP plants range will already range at levels of below 8 €cents/kWh by 2010 (DLR 2005). 
 
Fig. 2-2. Electricity supply scenario for Algeria. DLR 2005. 
In the subsequent year, the German Aerospace Center released a follow-up study, TRANS-CSP (DLR 
2006), which investigates the HVDC transmission of CSP-generated solar electricity from North 
Africa to Europe in greater detail. Like in Czisch 2005, a HVDC supply network is proposed for the 
transcontinental transfer of bulk electricity from renewable sources (see Fig. 2-3).  
 
Fig. 2-3. HVDC backbone grid integrating different types of renewable energies. DLR 2009. 
The study outlines a scenario in which MENA-based CSP plants would supply around 700 TWh/y of 
solar electricity to Europe by 2050, thereby covering more than 15 percent of the continent’s 
electricity demand. 20 power lines of 5 GW capacity each would be needed for electricity transfer, 
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requiring investments of €45 billion in addition to the €350 billion that would be needed for the CSP 
plants. The levelised electricity costs (including the transport) are estimated even lower than in the 
MED-CSP study: They amount to 5 €cents/kWh. The TRANS-CSP also provides examples for the 
possible geographical location of such transmission lines (see Fig. 2-4). For Algeria, one of the 
proposed 5 GW lines would start at Tindouf, and follow along a 3,100 km track to final destinations in 
France and Western Germany. However, most of these transmission lines would cross Moroccan 
territory as the Strait of Gibraltar provides the shortest underwater connection to Europe. 
 
 
Fig. 2-4. Proposed HVDC transmission lines. DLR 2006. 
In a subsequent survey (DLR 2009), the DLR applied GIS-based digital exclusion maps in order to 
identify suitable and cost-efficient HVDC transmission corridors for solar electricity. The analysis was 
carried out for eleven (hypothetic) CSP production sites in North Africa being connected to 27 load 
centres in Europe (see Fig. 2-5). According to the study, the HVDC transmission lines would feature a 
capacity of 3,200 MW and a voltage of 600 kV. For Algeria, the study proposes two submarine 
interconnectors, one with Spain, the other with Sardinia (Italy). The same locations for potential 
submarine links have also been identified in feasibility studies which were performed in 2003 and 
2004 on behalf of Sonelgaz and the Spanish and Italian transmission system operators REE and 
TERNA (Eurelectric 2007). However, the planning context for those lines was entirely different: The 
interconnections had the purpose to export gas-generated electricity from Algeria to Italy and Spain, 
and it was even planned to build gas-fired power plants exclusively for electricity export. 
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Fig. 2-5. Proposed HVDC transmission corridors between eleven CSP production sites and 27 European load 
centres. DLR 2009. 
2.2. Industrial Promotion and Political Support  
Given this point of origin, it is striking that these plans – although highly relevant for North African 
industry and policy makers – have largely been developed without local researchers. In many ways, 
they subscribe to a strongly Eurocentric view in terms of their agenda as well as in the disregard 
shown to the “host” countries of the Maghreb themselves. Many studies show a limited insight into the 
political and economic realities of North African countries and often entirely neglect all regional 
governance aspects. However, even a partial realisation of these plans will depend on a European-
North African cooperation regarding all key points of discussion, amongst them technology (transfer), 
finance and grid connection scenarios. 
2.2.1. TREC and the Desertec Industrial Initiative 
Apart from ambitious and successful domestic programs in several member states like Spain, 
Germany and Denmark, European research and policy-making have increasingly taken interest in 
power production and transport to the EU from outside Europe.  
Next to the researchers involved, various civil society and industry stakeholders promote the 
construction of large-scale renewable energy power plants in North Africa. One major group was the 
political lobby group TREC (Trans-Mediterranean Renewable Energy Corporation) that began 
working with the German section of the Club of Rome and focused its activities on Berlin and 
Brussels. Its plans have been in the German political discourse for well over a decade. TREC 
contributed to the discussions by launching its “Desertec White Book”, which has recently appeared in 
its fourth edition (Desertec Foundation 2009). The TREC concept was taken up by various committed 
individuals and a series of national groups (e.g. TREC-UK, Desertec-Méditerrané, etc.) was founded. 
In 2008, the group transformed and renamed itself into Desertec Foundation and registered in Berlin 
as an incorporated association.  
Also, between 1998 and 2005, the German government promoted this topic through research support 
for the above-mentioned DLR studies as well as within the European Union. Moreover, a series of 
 Wuppertal Institute, CREAD         14 
MENAREC Conferences (Middle East & North Africa Renewable Energy Conferences) supported 
these efforts on an international level. 
These activities have recently sparked the interest of German industry: on July 13, 2009, a group of 
major German and international corporations (ABB, Abengoa Solar, Desertec Foundation, Deutsche 
Bank, E.ON, HSH Nordbank, MAN Solar Millennium, Munich Re, M+W Zander, RWE, SCHOTT 
Solar, Siemens and the Algerian company Cevital announced in a press conference a memorandum of 
understanding seeking to promote the above-mentioned Desertec initiative and intending to found a 
Desertec Industrial Initiative (Dii). The formal registration of the consortium as a limited company 
has taken place in October 2009 (Dii 2009). In its founding declaration, the Dii announced overall 
costs of €400 billion, which it claimed to be willing and able to invest over the next 20 years into 
large-scale renewable power projects in the MENA region. In early 2010, five other companies joined 
the consortium (Enel, Nareva, RED Electrica de Espana, Saint-Gobain Solar). The enrolment of these 
Italian, Spanish, Italian and Moroccan groups was an important step for Dii both in terms of its 
outreach to the Mediterranean countries as well as to move public perception away from the 
misconception that the Dii is predominantly a German initiative. Now the Dii is officially supported 
by former UNEP-director Klaus Töpfer. 
The 2009 announcements met very different responses in Europe and North Africa. In Algeria, Chakib 
Khelil, at that point minister of Energy and Mines, was quoted saying, 
“I do not have any idea about that project and I cannot make any statement. This project has never 
been presented at the ministry nor at the relevant institutions.” (EE 2009) 
In Morocco, on the other hand, the situation is much different. The Moroccan energy minister Amina 
Benkhadra generally conveyed the notion that Morocco wanted to become a major Desertec partner 
and advocated for investment in her country in Europe. In February 2010, for instance, minister 
Benkhadra gave a seminar in the British House of Commons that was attended by the UK energy 
minister Lord Hunt. In this meeting, she advocated Morocco’s plan to build the first 500 MW CSP 
plant close to the southern town of Ouarzazate and invited power companies to bid on that US$9 
billion project.  
Reactions in Europe largely depended on the institutions’ stance on solar and nuclear power, major 
non-EU energy infrastructure investments and on their views regarding decentralised or centralised 
power generation. Apart from welcoming statements by parties, environmental NGOs and research 
institutions, there have also been critical voices. Eurosolar, a German solar energy lobby group, 
dubbed the plans “mirages in the Sahara desert” and “centralistic plans of the German power sector” 
that were designed to perpetuate the dominance of a few corporations in the national power sector 
(Eurosolar 2009). 
The European Parliament, however, has so far expressed cautious support of the initiative. In a 
recently adopted resolution on external aspects of energy security it “calls on the Council and 
Commission to cooperate with the Member States of the Mediterranean region and the countries of 
North Africa; […it] welcomes the recent progress made with the Desertec Industrial Initiative to 
develop the vast potential for solar energy in the Middle East and North Africa; stresses that EU action 
in relation to the Desertec project must be coherent and make an active contribution to the 
development of North African and Middle Eastern countries; calls, therefore, on the companies and 
Member States involved in this project - in close cooperation with the Commission – to promote 
development by means of genuine technology transfer and capacity-building aimed at local companies 
and civil society in order to ensure ownership and build a lasting partnership with the Mediterranean 
countries in which Desertec will be developed.” (European Parliament 2009) 
At the time of writing, the Dii is working on a detailed implementation strategy that defines a road 
map until 2020. This roadmap is supposed to be finalised by 2012 and it will entail a long-term vision 
beyond 2020. In talks and press announcements, Dii partners have stressed that the current Dii 
consortium is by no means intended to remain closed to potential partners that are willing to join, be it 
in the current scoping phase, be it in the later operational business. Also, the decision has been taken 
 Wuppertal Institute, CREAD         15 
to temporarily halt all further accessions of German firms which currently form the majority amongst 
the shareholders (eleven out of 17 companies). This move can be seen as a reaction to criticism about 
the current dominance of European, especially German companies in the Dii and might be an 
important strategic move in the internationalisation of the Dii. 
2.2.2. The Solar Plan of the Union for the Mediterranean 
On a general level, the European Community/Union has worked on outreach programs towards the 
non-EU member countries on the Southern and Eastern shores of the Mediterranean for at least the last 
15 years. First multilateral efforts were structured by the Barcelona Process launched in 1995 as a 
framework of cooperation in social, political and economic affairs. Due to the poor performance of 
this process, the EU’s efforts were redrafted and refounded as European Neighbourhood and 
Partnership Instrument (ENPI) in 2007. This development has been paralleled by the realisation of a 
French policy initiative, the Union for the Mediterranean/Union pour la Méditerranée (UfM) in 2008.  
The UfM consists of the EU member states, Jordan, Mauritania, and all countries bordering the 
Mediterranean while the Arab League has been invited to join the biannual summits as an observer. In 
order to guarantee a balanced system of power-sharing, the UfM will be co-presided over by an EU 
and a non-EU member respectively. The first two states having assumed these rotating positions are 
France and Egypt. While it is the stated intention of its founders to reinvigorate the stalled 
Barcelona/European Neighbourhood Process, a joint permanent committee in Brussels and a bureau 
in Barcelona will ensure that day-to-day working processes are followed up and the summits are 
prepared. 
One of the UfM’s flagship projects is the Mediterranean Solar Plan (MSP) that was included in the 
final declaration of the UfM’s founding summit in Paris on 13 July 2008. 
In the first phase, the German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and 
Nuclear Safety and its French counterpart are leading on the project. The Mediterranean Solar Plan 
has been divided into three work phases. The immediate preparatory phase until 2010 will be followed 
by a two-year long pilot phase that will result in the production of an Immediate Action Plan (IAP) and 
a Master Plan Study that will be informed by the project currently set up by the European Union 
(“Paving the way for the Mediterranean Solar Plan”) (Lorec 2010).  
The main goal of the IAP is to start a sequence of pilot projects for the integration of renewable 
energies into the various national grid systems as well as policy programs for energy efficiency. It 
aims to facilitate in the short term a series of projects in the Mediterranean region, asking partner 
countries for a selection of priority projects to ensure broad political support. 
The bureau of the MSP, that regards itself as a facilitator and a mediator in terms of donor 
organisations, distinguishes between public and private projects. Integrating wind energy and both PV 
and CSP, the scope of the MSP is wide, which explains the roughly 200 projects registered. In general, 
projects are registered on the MSP list (that remains unpublished) through the member states’ 
ministries or executing agencies. This implies that the registered projects differ strongly in terms of 
scope, size, and feasibility. In spite of this, the MSP secretariat has so far chosen not to introduce a 
transregional binding methodology, as the multilateral process to agree on such a mechanism would 
have taken years and would arguably have been a rather useless undertaking, given the large number 
of member states and heterogeneous renewable energy policy frameworks, technology preferences and 
funding schemes. Thus, flexibility and transparency, rather than a total control of the projects, is what 
is achieved by the MSP administration. 
Parallel to that, the MSP will produce a major study characterising potential sites for RE production, 
identifying the best possible policies incentivising the deployment of renewables with a target share of 
20 GW of renewable power capacity and 20 percent energy savings compared to a business as usual 
scenario until 2020. The study will build on the results of the work by Resources and Logistics (2010), 
which presents a useful overview of the current situation and identifies a way ahead. However, it 
might be the case that stakeholders will abandon the concept of the IAP in the future and put 
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additional focus on improving the regulatory frameworks with regards to renewable energy and energy 
efficiency in the Mediterranean states beforehand. 
Concerning the overall investment costs, a total sum of €45 billion is forecast until 2020. While 
various projects have been registered with the CTF and other investment banks, the financing of most 
projects should not be the key problem. Instead, it is the differing funding conditions, loan times and 
other details of the financial architecture for the larger projects in this scheme that currently needs 
attention on behalf of the MSP.  
As next steps, stakeholders have identified three main aims: the production of a master plan study, the 
construction of the Moroccan Ouarzazate CSP plant, and the test of the application of article 9 of the 
new EU energy directive (see chapter 2.2.3). Stakeholders stressed, however, that the MSP is not a 
goal in itself, nor can it take up the work of national renewable energy policy plans. It can only serve 
as a coordinator and facilitator of the national initiatives and can assist member states in developing a 
conducive regulatory framework and in acquiring funds. The genuine initiative, however, must stem 
from the member states themselves, which is why the MSP secretariat also welcomes the 
developments such as the Moroccan or Tunisian solar plans as a step in the right direction. It would be 
desirable for Algeria to develop a plan similar to the ones of its neighbours, as the Algerian 
programme indicatif cannot yet be seen as a fully-fledged national renewable energy policy 
programme.  
2.2.3. The EU Renewable Energy Directive 
In December 2008, the member states of the European Union signed a far-reaching agreement about 
the increased use of renewable energies in the community’s energy supply. In the Directive on the 
Promotion of the Use of Energy from Renewable Sources (EU 2009) all member states committed 
themselves to binding renewable energy shares in their national energy balance (Tab. 2-1). Each 
member is obliged to present an individual roadmap outlining how the state intends to meet its 
renewable energy goal. It is up to the member states to choose their own, individual means for the 
goal’s implementation. These could include various sectors, such as transport, industry, or heating, but 
also renewable electricity production.  
As a remarkable innovation, the EU renewable energy directive facilitates the import of renewable 
electricity generated by third countries. Such a third country could, for instance, be Algeria. The third 
country provision is given in Article 9 of the directive, which stipulates that energy produced outside 
the EU can be financially supported through laws promoting renewable energies as long as this energy 
export does not lower the previous RE quota of the country of origin. Also, this power can be added to 
the respective countries’ quotas for renewable energy power production/consumption. Further, the 
directive demands that all “green” power to be exported to the EU need to be documented by the 
Transmission System Operators (TSOs). In detail, it has to be proven that the amount of imported 
electricity from a third country is transported via a firmly nominated interconnection capacity by all 
TSOs involved. Moreover, the equivalent amount of electricity has to be registered in the schedule of 
balance of the European TSO, and the transmission capacity for the renewable export has to be 
nominated at the same period of time (Article 9, 2a).  
An interesting feature of the directive is that it also allows a kind of non-physical electricity export via 
a not yet existing interconnection to the European grid. For this exception, it has to be proven that 
actual power lines will be built within a realistic time frame. Thus, according to the directive, Algeria, 
for instance, could promote the construction of renewable energy power plants even before their 
electricity physically reaches the EU. It remains to be seen whether this energy trade option could 
develop into a key element of kick-starting large-scale electricity exports from North Africa to Europe. 
The EU energy directive explicitly limits this provision to cases where construction of the physical 
interconnectors has started before 2016 and their operation is scheduled by 2022 (Article 9, 4.). 
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Tab. 2-1. Share of energy from renewable sources in gross final consumption of energy 2005, 2020. EU 2009 
European National Renewable Energy Targets 2005 and 2020 
 2005 2020  2005 2020 
Austria 23,3% 34,0% Latvia 32,6% 40,0% 
Belgium 2,2% 13,0% Lithuania 15,0% 23,0% 
Bulgaria 9,4% 16,0% Luxembourg 0,9% 11,0% 
Cyprus 2,9% 13,0% Malta 0,0% 10,0% 
Czech 
Republic 
6,1% 13,0% Netherlands 2,4% 14,0% 
Denmark 17,0% 30,0% Poland 7,2% 15,0% 
Estonia 18,0% 25,0% Portugal 20,5% 31,0% 
Finland 28,5% 38,0% Romania 17,8% 24,0% 
France 10,3% 23,0% Slovak 
Republic 
6,7% 14,0% 
Germany 5,8% 18,0% Slovenia 16,0% 25,0% 
Greece 6,9% 18,0% Spain 8,7% 20,0% 
Hungary 4,3% 13,0% Sweden 39,8% 49,0% 
Ireland 3,1% 16,0% United 
Kingdom 
1,3% 15,0% 
Italy 5,2% 17,0%    
 
These efforts need to be placed in the broader context of developing a common and diversified 
European energy supply strategy. In September 2009, this was also the subject of a debate during the 
European Parliament plenary sitting. Then EU energy commissioner Andris Piebalgs and several 
MEPs reiterated the need for the development of a robust EU energy supply structure. While pipeline 
projects such as Nabucco enhance the diversification of European fossil energy supply, the physical 
power interconnection with North Africa – assisted by the commercial incentive of the new renewable 
energy directive – is to further promote development in that field. Similarly, his successor Günther 
Oettinger voiced clear support for the Dii in a meeting of the three Maghreb energy ministers in 
Algiers that he attended in June 2010. The new energy commissioner stated that the EU would 
continue to support grid upgrade and country interconnectors between North Africa and Europe and 
would decide on European subsidies or feed-in-tariffs once the consortium had presented a detailed 
business plan. It must be stressed, however, that the funding option of the EU energy directive has 
been designed as a tool for the individual member states, not as a RE-promotion instrument of the 
European Commission. Commissioner Oettinger has repeatedly hinted at the idea of a pan-European 
renewable electricity support scheme, which could then also entails the support of electricity imports 
from the Maghreb states. This, however, would necessitate a new legal instrumentation and would 
represent a major change in European energy policy. It is thus rather unlikely that such an instrument 
will be introduced in the near and mid-term future. 
As regards national renewable energy import plans, it remains unclear whether the new renewable 
energy directive will indeed become a success. While the possibility of EU support remains open, it 
remains doubtful whether individual countries will open their national renewable energy funding 
schemes to renewable energy production abroad. In their submissions of the preparatory documents by 
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the end of 2009, however, some of the member states have voiced support for such a mechanism. 
France and Spain have explicitly mentioned the MSP, while Italy’s communication has integrated 
projects that were part of the MSP without mentioning the plan itself. All three countries, however, 
have not indicated fixed targets or capacities for renewable electricity import yet, and there is also no 
guarantee that these states will integrate their plans into the binding national renewable energy action 
plans. Germany and Greece have also expressed the general possibility of renewables imports but, 
again, no detailed decisions have been taken. What the new energy directive yields for the field of 
renewable electricity import from the Maghreb will thus be revealed in late 2010. 
2.2.4. World Bank Support for CSP Projects in North Africa 
In October 2009, the World Bank announced that it would finance 13 solar thermal power plants in 
selected countries of the Middle East (Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan), corresponding to 
an investment volume of US$5.5 billion. It is envisaged that these plants will have an accumulated 
capacity of 900 MW, which would equal a 300 percent increase in global power production based on 
CSP. Tab. 2-2 provides an overview of World Bank CSP projects in the Middle East. 
Tab. 2-2. List of CSP Projects in planning or implementation phase. World Bank/CTF 2009 
 
The CTF favours its multi-country approach not only because of its own multilateral nature, but has 
put forth three core arguments for that. Primarily, it argues that only the development of a multitude of 
CSP plants that stretch over the entire region will serve as a major demonstration project. Secondly, 
only this approach could bring about the much-needed economies of scale for construction and 
maintenance, while, thirdly, only in the case of a promising large-scale business opportunity power 
companies would be willing to go ahead with the necessary grid upgrades between the EU and its 
neighbouring countries. Cooperation between the CTF and other initiatives is good: all 13 projects 
and, in addition to that, two power line schemes, are registered with the MSP.  
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With a scheduled accumulated capacity of 230 MW, the three projects envisaged for Algeria (see Tab. 
2-2) would fit well into the national renewable energy plan (see below chapter 4), which has outlined 
CSP to be the key technology for Algeria (CREG 2008). 
2.2.5. The Transgreen Consortium 
While the Dii has begun to work on the realisation of its projects during the last year, it has not always 
been welcomed by all European countries. Particularly in France, where the government has worked 
hard to establish the Union for the Mediterranean and the Mediterranean Solar Plan, Desertec has 
since (wrongly) been perceived as a German initiative that might endanger the “French” Solar Plan.  
In light of this context, a recent development is particularly noteworthy.  
On 25 May 2010, the Transgreen project was founded in Cairo during an energy ministers’ meeting of 
the 43 member states of the Union for the Mediterranean. Led by the French utility EDF, the project 
intends to bring together power companies, network operators and high-tension equipment makers. 
The consortium itself is structured in a very similar way to the Dii. It likewise plans to launch a 
feasibility study as a first phase before actually constructing any lines. In total, eleven mostly French 
companies, such as ABB, Alstom/Areva, Nexans, Prysmian, Cap Gemini or Atos Origin, RTE have 
joined the consortium; Spanish and North African companies are expected to join in due course as 
well. In addition to these, Transgreen has also taken in Siemens and the French group Saint-Gobain, 
both also part of the Dii. 
At a first glance, the Transgreen project appears to be a competitor to Desertec – this, however, seems 
to be a misconception as both sides have announced strong cooperation and excellent interaction with 
each other on the working level. Desertec CEO Paul van Son has openly welcomed the establishment 
of this consortium, which might be headed by André Merlin, president of the board of RTF. 
Thus, there is full potential that the two consortia add to each other in a mutually beneficial way: 
Transgreen could deliver to Europe the energy (or part of it) that has been generated by the Dii in 
North Africa. After feasibility studies, a first step of Transgreen might be the upgrade of what is 
currently the only power connection between the two continents, linking Morocco and Spain, with a 
capacity of 1,400 MW. This – in addition to another power cable (probably from Tunisia to Italy) – 
could facilitate the work of the Dii in a major way. 
2.2.6. Common Strategies and Cooperation between Public and Private Sector 
Initiatives? 
To a certain extent, it is an open question in which way the four projects outlined in this chapter – the 
MSP, the Dii, the CTF and Transgreen – will interact with each other. Given their similar scope, 
similar technology focus and similarly high ambitions, there is potential for both substantial 
competition or for constructive cooperation enabling the initiatives to overcome the various burdens.  
While the CTF initiative is located at the World Bank, the MSP operates in the at times ineffective and 
politically loaded framework of the UfM. However, there seems to be a strong willingness to 
cooperate with each other on behalf of both public sector initiatives, possibly also owed to the fact that 
the MSP does not have own major funds to facilitate large-scale power projects. The private sector 
character of the Dii and Transgreen as industry initiatives makes these initiatives less exposed to 
negative developments on the political level, but, at the same time, they might lack political clout in 
negotiations.  
Unfortunately, the initiatives on the European side and of the World Bank are currently not matched 
by North African initiatives of similar size, although, as shown, most states have recently developed 
national renewable energy strategies. Indeed, North African countries are yet to identify a common 
answer or at least a common voice in this transcontinental setting. As it has been announced that the 
recent meeting of the three Maghreb energy ministers in Algiers (June 2010) also focused on the 
various international renewable energy initiatives, it can be hoped that a more coordinated approach 
will soon be developed amongst North African political and business elites. 
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In the following sections the situation of Algeria will be assessed as a first approach to bring the North 
African perspective – industrially, legally, and developmentally – into the discussion. 
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3. Renewable Generation Technologies and Transmission Options for 
Algeria 
The following section discusses the possible technology options in the Algerian context. General 
characteristics will be given in order to draw a broad picture of renewable energy technologies for 
export options as well as for domestic supply. 
3.1. Selection of Technologies 
Algeria is endowed with various types of renewable energies, namely solar and wind energy and to 
some extent also hydro energy and biomass. In this chapter, however, some technologies were 
excluded from the assessment for lack of natural potentials and lack of potential for the export of 
electricity. These are hydropower, biomass and geothermal energy. Some other technologies were 
excluded because they are currently not available for larger scale applications, among them solar dish 
Stirling systems, solar chimneys and ocean wave energy.  
The technology options are characterised according to the following criteria: 
• Natural potentials 
• Technological status 
• Base and peak load capability 
• Ecology 
The topic grid integration is discussed in a separate section for the whole range of renewables 
technologies.  
3.2. Renewable Energy Potentials in Algeria 
The assessment of potential is based on two different types of sources: assessments of the Algerian 
government (also used in UbiFrance 2009) and the in-depth studies conducted by the German 
Aerospace Center (DLR). DLR calculated data mainly from satellite imaging and further processing to 
derive technical and eventually economic potentials. Tab. 3-1 summarises solar, wind, geothermal and 
biomass potentials for electricity generation. There is a large difference between PV and CSP 
economic potentials. This is somewhat distorting because at the time when the assessments of 
potentials were made, the cost difference and expected cost differences in the near future were very 
large. However, this situation has changed significantly during the last three years as PV technology 
prices decreased sharply; hence, investment costs for power plant investors have decreased. The effect 
is an increase in the economically utilisable potential on the PV side, which will lead to a decrease of 
CSP potential. The major advantage of the DLR study is that all renewable energy potentials were 
assessed with an identical set of methodologies. 
Tab. 3-1. Economic electricity supply side potential of renewable energies in Algeria, TWh/a. For comparison: 
power production in Algeria in 2005 stood at 35 TWh. DLR 2005 
Algeria CSP Wind-
power 
PV Hydro-
power 
Geothermal Biomass 
Economic 
potential 
168,972 35 13.9 0.5 4.7 12.1 
 
In addition to the DLR study, assessments by Algerian institutions have to be analysed. The Center for 
the Development of Renewable Energies (CDER) surveyed different types of renewable energies. Data 
are gathered in the “Guidelines to Renewable Energies” report by the Ministry of Energy and Mines 
(MEM 2007). Algeria’s MEM concludes that “the biggest potential in Algeria is solar” (MEM 2007) 
(see Tab. 3-2).  
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Tab. 3-2. Data on solar radiation in Algeria. MEM 2007 
Region Coastal Highlands Sahara 
Average sun hours per year 2650 3000 3500 
Average energy received, 
kWh/m2/a 
1700 1900 2650 
 
The data presented by the MEM (2007) is supported by data compiled by the World Energy Council 
that stay in the same range: Annual average insolation for Algeria is rated at 2,000 hours while the 
high plateaus receive about 3,900 hours. This results in an average solar energy potential of 2,400 
kWh/m2/a (compare Fig. 3-1).  
Fig. 3-1. Solar irradiation maps for Algeria. Left: Global irradiation on optimally inclined PV surface. PVGis 
2010. Right: Direct normal irradiation (DNI) for CSP systems, excluding unsuitable sites (white). DLR 2005 
 
National onshore wind energy potential is rated as being low (MEM 2007). However, according to an 
analysis comparing wind data from 75 locations in Algeria (published in 2000), there are several 
promising wind power locations (Hamane/Khellaf 2000), see Fig. 3-2. Offshore data were not 
available. 
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Fig. 3-2. Wind map showing onshore potential. CDER, from MEM 2007.  
According to the Ministry of Energy and Mines, Algeria has potential for low-temperature geothermal 
applications (hot springs) in the range of 700 MW (MEM 2007).  
Hence, in the light of sufficient potentials for the export of electricity, in the following only solar and 
wind energy will be discussed. 
3.3. Solar Energy Technologies 
3.3.1. State of Technology 
In general, there are two different approaches for the utilisation of solar energy: direct conversion of 
sunlight to electricity – photovoltaics – and the collection of heat for steam generation that can then be 
converted to electricity by a generator. Both technology approaches will be assessed in the following 
section. 
3.3.1.1. Concentrating Solar Power (CSP) 
Parabolic trough systems are the best-established CSP technology. Currently, a total capacity of about 
500 MW is installed and more than 2,000 MW are in the planning phase globally (SM 2009). 
Parabolic through systems consist of long, parabolic metallised collectors that are adjusted to the sun 
to concentrate sunlight. In the focal line, a fluid-filled pipe (using thermal oil or water) absorbs the 
heat. The fluid transports the heat to the power generation system (usually a conventional steam 
turbine cycle). Efficiencies are in the range of 11-16 percent. Typical plant sizes are between 50 and 
80 MWel. However, larger plants are also planned, reaching 250 – 350 MW. 
Fresnel systems are similar to parabolic through systems but use several flat mirrors to concentrate the 
sunlight. Fresnel reflector pilot plants are currently under development. They can have lower 
production costs than parabolic through systems, but are also of lower efficiency. 
Central receiver technology uses a large array of mirrors (heliostats) that follow the sun in two 
dimensions and concentrate the sunlight on a receiver on top of a tower. Temperatures can reach 1,000 
°C. These high temperatures can be used for the vaporisation of working fluids to drive steam turbines 
and generators. Further applications are industrial steam production or solar chemical processes. The 
maximal plants size is currently 11 MWel; larger power stations are under construction  
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3.3.1.2. Photovoltaic Systems 
Photovoltaic systems use the photoelectric effect of turning light energy (photons) into electricity. As 
sunlight is directly converted to electricity, the irradiation conditions rule over the power output of a 
PV plant, which in consequence shows an intermittent electricity generation behaviour. Therefore, PV 
electricity cannot satisfy base load requirements. This is a major disadvantage in comparison to CSP 
systems on the one hand. On the other hand, PV bears several structural advantages, among them low 
operation and maintenance costs and its independence from cooling water, which could prove as a 
major advantage in desert regions compared to CSP systems with high water demand. PV plants can 
be built over a wide size range from 10 kWel to 200 MWel and are thus adaptable to local 
requirements (Hennicke/Fischedick 2007). They can also be used for combined heat/cold and power 
generation (so-called co- and trigeneration) and for desalination (BMU 2006). The largest PV plants 
are currently in the range of about 50 MW. 
3.3.2. Costs of Technologies, Including External Costs 
Currently, solar thermal power plants on the basis of parabolic troughs are the cheapest option to use 
solar radiation for power production. Photovoltaic electricity generation has in previous years been 
considered as the most expensive solar electricity option with investment and generation costs about 
three times as high as for solar thermal plants. However, scale effects (build-up of surplus production 
capacities for economies of scale) and the global financial crisis have lead to a reduction of costs and 
prices. 
Fig. 3-3 summarises specific investment costs for renewable energy power generation technologies 
today and in the future. Capital investment costs for renewable energy technologies are expected to 
remain higher than for fossil fuel power stations except for wind power and PV. In contrast to the 
falling costs for other renewable energy technologies, CSP costs will increase until 2020, assuming 
that the increasing solar share from 25 % to 90 % requires expensive storage technologies. 
 
Fig. 3-3. Specific investment costs in US-$2000 per kilowatt on timescale. Irrek 2008 (nuclear), DLR 2005 
(others). 
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The costs described above are direct costs from an investor’s perspective and exclude costs for 
damages caused by the use of the technology to the global climate system, human health, crop 
production, etc. It is generally difficult to express such damages in monetary terms; however, these are 
real costs, just listed on another bill. External costs of renewable energies are about one order of 
magnitude lower than those of fossil and nuclear fuels. More details are given in DLR/ISI (2006).  
In sum, two divergent tendencies are visible regarding technology costs. While capital investment and 
electricity generation costs of renewable energy technologies are likely to decrease further due to 
learning effects on the one hand, costs for fossil energy based technologies will increase due to 
escalating fuel and CO2 certificate prices. As a consequence, electricity from most renewable energy 
sources will be cheaper than fossil fuel based electricity in only a few years. By internalising external 
costs, RE technologies are already in the same range as fossil power generation at the moment. 
3.3.3. Base and Peak Load Capabilities 
Solar electricity generation in general, PV as well as CSP and solar towers, is peak load capable 
because there is a good correlation of electricity supply and demand (WI/DLR 2008), especially 
electricity demand for air conditioning at noon. In combination with efficient heat storage and/or an 
optional additional firing, a CSP plant is even base load capable (BMU 2006). In perspective to future 
system development when traditional base load will become increasingly obsolete, especially CSP 
solutions will be able to provide so-called balancing power: intermittent sources like PV, but all the 
more wind, will feed into grids, and in times of low feed-in, CSP will be able to react flexibly to such 
intermittency. 
3.3.4. Ecological Aspects 
The analysis of ecological aspects includes two different sectors: First, the direct impact on the 
surrounding area during the use of the technology needs to be considered. Second, the total 
contamination and long-term aspects over the whole life-cycle of the technology will be analysed (see 
Fig. 3-4). 
 
Fig. 3-4. Specific LCA emissions of pollutants (left axis) and the greenhouse gas CO2 (right axis) of renewable, 
fossil and nuclear technologies. Öko-Institut 2007, DLR/ISI 2006. 
CSP. Land-use intensity of CSP systems – parabolic troughs as well as Fresnel systems and solar 
power towers – can harm ecological habitats, e.g. through shading. A comparatively large area of land 
(approximately one square kilometre for 20-60 MW of generation capacity) is required. However, 
shading may also have positive effects from the perspective of human life, e.g. the possibility of land 
use for agriculture. Considering the life-cycle use of land including raw material mining, mine 
operation, raw material upgrading, infrastructure and disposal, solar technologies are considered to be 
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the most area-efficient renewable electricity generating technologies (DLR 2005). Operating a non-
hybrid CSP plant does not cause air pollution (WI/DLR 2008, DLR 2005). The heat transfer fluid 
(usually a type of thermal oil) of some CSP plants can be hazardous and needs to be disposed of 
regularly (DLR 2005). Apart from this, there are no critical components or substances correlated to 
CSP plants. The ecosystem at the location can be completely restored (WI/DLR 2008) after 
dismantling of the CSP plant. Water supply for CSP plants can be problematic in desert regions. 
Therefore, dry-cooling systems have to be taken into consideration 
PV. Photovoltaic systems also require large areas. Additionally, PV modules contain amounts of 
heavy metals and therefore need to be recycled after the end of their lifetime.  
3.4. Wind Energy 
3.4.1. State of Technology 
Wind turbines convert kinetic energy from air movement into electric energy using a rotor that drives 
a generator. Wind turbine sizes range from some kilowatt to several megawatt (Hennicke/Fischedick 
2007). Today, the largest turbines have a conversion capacity of 6 MWel. On a suitable location, such 
a plant can deliver electricity of more than 15 GWh/a, enough to supply about 5,000 German three-
person-households with electricity. 
3.4.2. Costs of Wind Turbines Including External Costs 
Costs of wind turbines have decreased due to the production of large quantities and optimised 
production processes. According to recent studies, wind power generation costs have become 
competitive to those of newly constructed conventional power plants (BWE 2009). Future cost 
development can be seen in Fig. 3-3. 
3.4.3. Base and Peak Load Capabilities 
Due to intermittent generation, wind power is only capable of base load supply in a combination with 
back-up systems (like diesel generators for single stand-alone systems or gas and steam power stations 
for large wind farms) or with energy storage technologies (WI/DLR 2008). The combination with 
renewable energy sources is also possible in the form of “virtual power plants” that combine different 
distributed energy generation technologies Fluctuating feed-in is a problem for system integration of 
wind power electricity, but the quality of wind forecast has increased steadily (Hennicke/Fischedick 
2007). Bottlenecks in transmission lines have to be removed by grid extension, grid upgrade (e.g. from 
220 kV up to 380 kV) and by intelligent grid management. Modern wind generators can provide 
adjustable idle power to support grid stability. 
3.4.4. Ecological Aspects 
Environmental impacts of wind turbines include noise emissions, disturbances for animals and 
detraction of the landscape. The erection of offshore wind plants can destroy benthic ecosystems and 
possibly disturb whales through infrasound. Offshore wind farms can also have a positive effect on 
animal populations (in terms of number of individuals) as water columns in wind farms serve as 
nursery grounds for larvae of a multitude of marine animals. 
There is no ecological impact after use of wind turbines (WI/DLR 2008). According to life cycle 
assessments, offshore wind plants cause total emissions of around 24g CO2eq/kWhel (Öko-Institut 
2007). 
3.5. Grid Integration and Electricity Transmission 
The provision of sufficient infrastructure for the generation and transport of large amounts of 
renewable electricity in Algeria can only be achieved by a substantial, innovative upgrade and 
modernisation of the Algerian power transmission system. This chapter provides an overview of the 
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status quo of the Algerian grid and discusses possible technological options for the future transmission 
of renewable electricity to Europe.  
3.5.1. Current Status of the Algerian National Transmission Network 
Algeria has an extensive AC network, not only covering the densely populated coastal areas, but also 
– due to the presence of its oil and gas industry – reaching far into the largely unpopulated centre of 
the country. Owner of the grid is the state utility Sonelgaz, which is also responsible for operation, 
management and development of the grid. The grid is displayed in Fig. 3-5. 
Fig. 3-5. Algerian electricity grid. Sonelgaz 2009. 
 
 
Fig. 3-5. Algerian electricity grid. Sonelgaz 2009. 
Sonelgaz states that the total length of its transmission network is around 18,000 km. According to the 
company’s definition, this number includes lines with voltage levels down to 60 kV. Transmission 
lines with 400 kV sum up to less than 1,300 km length. Currently, Sonelgaz is putting strong efforts 
into upgrading these grid lines. Projects under construction include a 400 kV east-west transversal 
line, as well as a 400 kV line reaching into the deep south of the country. Reinforcements of cross-
border connections with the neighbouring countries Morocco, Tunisia and Libya, also on the basis of 
400 kV technology, are progressing. In September 2009, a new interconnection with Morocco, 
featuring a transfer capacity of 1,000 MW, was inaugurated. Algeria’s transnational interconnection 
projects with its Maghreb neighbours are part of a larger framework programme, the so-called 
Mediterranean Ring Project (MED-RING), a 400 kV electricity circuit encompassing all countries of 
the Mediterranean basin. 
Besides the terrestrial interconnections, Algeria also has plans for submarine electricity links with its 
European neighbours on the other shore of the Mediterranean. Discussion of interlink projects with 
Italy and Spain already started in the late 1990s – a time long before the ideas of Desertec or the 
Mediterranean Solar Plan appeared on the international agenda.  
For the interconnection with Spain, a feasibility study was carried out in 2003. It foresees a 250-km-
long 400 kV DC underwater cable spanning from the western Algerian coast (at the location Terga) to 
Almeria in southern Spain. The underwater link to Italy via the island of Sardinia represents a similar, 
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but more ambitious project due to the longer distance. The feasibility study for this project was 
accomplished in 2004. It has to be pointed out that the main driving force behind the above-mentioned 
studies were the low gas prices in the 1990s. The assumption was that by exporting (gas-generated) 
electricity, Algeria could achieve higher revenues than by selling the gas itself to the European 
markets, where prices were low. It was forecast that the export lines would be constructed in parallel 
with large gas power plants exclusively designed for export purposes. At the moment, however, these 
projects seem to have been put on hold, most likely due to the higher gas prices of the last years.  
3.5.2. Options for Renewable Electricity Transmission to Europe 
From a technical point of view, HVDC undersea cables are without alternative when it comes to long-
distance transmission across the Mediterranean sea. However, for the part of the overland transport 
through Algerian territory, two different approaches are possible.  
Direct export approach. The electricity could be converted into HVDC already at the generation sites 
(wind farms, solar power plants). In this scenario, power would flow directly towards the export 
destination (Europe), meaning that the power lines, as well as the renewable generation plants, would 
be exclusively set up for the purpose of electricity export to Europe (“direct export”), see Fig. 3-6. 
 
Fig. 3-6. Option Direct Export to Europe. Brand, unpublished. 
Grid integration approach. The second option is the feed-in of renewable electricity into the Algerian 
(AC) electricity grid prior to being exported (“grid integration”). This would allow the Algerian 
consumer to (partly) consume the green electricity himself. The Algerian grid operator could hold 
sway over the quantities being exported, and allow, for instance, only residual generation (‘surplus 
power’) to be dispatched to Europe. In this scenario, AC-DC converter stations would only need to be 
installed close to the Algerian shore, see Fig. 3-7. 
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Fig. 3-7. Option Grid Integration. Brand, unpublished. 
3.5.3. Assessment of Direct Export and Grid Integration Options 
The Direct Export option can be interpreted as the ‘best match’ to the initial Desertec concept. 
Therefore, it might be preferred by the European proponents of renewable electricity imports from 
Algeria. From their point of view, the required framework conditions are simple: With the Algerian 
electricity system not being involved – neither technically nor commercially – Algerian authorities 
would only have to provide the necessary authorisations as well as the land rights for the solar power 
plants and the respective transmission lines. The straightforwardness of the concept has a further 
appeal, especially for investors: all project assets (generation units and the gridlines) could entirely 
remain in the hands of one single legal entity, allowing for a simple setup in financing and operation. 
On the other hand, the Direct Export concept might be prone to criticism due to its entirely unilateral 
character: firstly, it would not provide any contribution to the Algerian energy supply; secondly, there 
is the risk that the Algerian power sector might not sufficiently profit from the project, if it is, for 
instance, entirely carried out by foreign consortia. 
The Grid Integration approach, on the other hand, appears to fit better with the preferences of 
Algerian industry policy. In the first place, the task of integrating renewable generation units into the 
national power grid requires a high involvement of Algerian engineering and industry capacity, which, 
in consequence, would very likely create more added value for the national economy. As a drawback, 
it has to be mentioned that with increasing feed-in of renewable power, the Algerian electricity system 
will also have to deal with the intermittent nature of wind parks or solar plants. For this challenge, 
however, the country’s conventional power generation system appears relatively well prepared: It is 
mostly based on flexible gas turbine power plants, known as good balancers of fluctuating electricity. 
By integrating and balancing renewable power within the Algerian electricity system, the power could 
to a certain extent even be “processed” prior to export: It might become possible that Algeria exports 
the amount of renewable electricity in the form of “renewable base-load” to European countries.  
Despite these advantages, it needs to be underlined that the Grid Integration approach is only viable if 
(smaller) renewable generation units are successively added to the power system, and if there is 
sufficient time for the transmission grid to undergo the necessary upgrading process. When it comes to 
vast export-oriented wind or solar thermal energy projects the size of the Algerian power system (GW-
scale), only the Direct Export scheme can be considered a viable solution. 
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In order to complete the picture of renewable export possibilities, a further potential renewable 
electricity transfer scheme from Algeria to Europe has to be mentioned. It involves the utilisation of 
the Moroccan AC transmission network, its undersea interlink to the Iberian peninsula and (depending 
on the final export destination) further European transmission system operators (TSOs). Solar 
electricity, generated for example by a CSP plant in Algeria, could be conducted to the destination 
country via a chain of various TSOs (Brand, 2009). Precondition for that operation is that the needed 
transmission capacities are in advance reserved for the time slot when the CSP plant is productive. 
From a current perspective, it seems unlikely that very large amounts of renewable electricity could be 
transferred by this relatively complicated scheme. Nevertheless, it offers the advantage that it is 
compatible with paragraph 9 of the European energy directive (see chapter 2.2.3) and does not require 
the construction of export lines. First pilot projects could already be performed with this setup.  
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4. Legal and Regulatory Aspects for Renewable Electricity Export 
4.1. Energy Policy in Algeria 
Like other energy producing countries, Algeria reserves a strategic role for fossil energies. On the one 
hand, this is due to the fact that hydrocarbons constitute the country’s main export products and by far 
the largest source of foreign currency income for the country. On the other hand, this is because the 
way different governments have used hydrocarbons has not only characterised the different energy 
policies, but has also constituted the prime mover of economic development in Algeria. As a matter of 
fact, the (fossil) energy sector yields more than 97 percent of Algeria’s export incomes and contributes 
to more than 60 percent of the country’s national budget.  
Beyond the central position the energy sector occupies in the Algerian national economy, its 
dimensions have periodically triggered questions about its position as key resource. Indeed, public 
debate has often appealed to decision-makers to promote a diversified economy in order to establish 
an export equilibrium and to reduce the dominant role of hydrocarbons. In other words, the questions 
is how to reconcile the permanent imperative to develop export capacities and the satisfaction of 
growing domestic energy demands with the non-sustainable character of hydrocarbons and the quest 
for clean, sustainable and economically feasible forms of electricity generation. 
Both on the international and on the Algerian level, the sustainability debate is not a recent one. 
Initiated in the 1970s, Algerian public policy has first outlined its policies in the 1980s in the 
framework of a national energy policy adopted in December 1981. This institutional framework 
remains the legal reference for political debates on energy policy until the present day. 
This energy policy doctrine rests on three fundamental principles: 
• first and foremost, to provide domestic electricity consumers with a comprehensive and 
uninterrupted power supply 
• to preserve energy resources to guarantee the future energy independence of the country 
• to promote exports in order to provide the finances for Algerian socio-economic development 
Those three key goals of national energy policy have constituted the foundation for the formulation of 
the “model of national energy consumption” that was adopted by the council of ministers on 20 June 
1984. This model introduced a new concept of energy use by differentiating between promotion and 
rationalisation of energy use. The major points developed for energy consumption are: 
• the preferential use of natural gas 
• the use of liquefied natural gas, LNG 
• the progressive reduction of the share of hydrocarbon products in the national energy balance 
• the orientation of electricity towards specific usages 
• the rational use of energy through the introduction of low-energy technologies 
• the promotion and development of renewable energies 
Encouraged by the international environment favourable towards renewable energies in the 1990s and 
the 1992 Rio Summit, Algeria has worked for the formalisation of energy-related innovation since the 
late 1990s. A legal framework for energy regulation has been voted for on 28 July 1999 (law n°99-09). 
This law defined the means and conditions of Algerian policy and reaffirmed the 1980s option of 
energy consumption models. In its core philosophy, this law strengthens the option of energy 
efficiency. The law introduced norms and standards for energy efficiency in new buildings and 
electrical appliances. Further, it introduced energy efficiency controls on new and imported goods 
enforced by APRUE, the Algerian National Agency for the Promotion and Rationalisation of Energy 
Use (Agence nationale pour la promotion et la rationalisation de l’utilisation de l’énergie). 
A national energy efficiency policy was adopted in 2003. It implemented the law n°99-09 of 29 July 
1999, introducing a broad concept of energy efficiency (maîtrise de l’énergie). The implementation 
instruments for this strategy are constituted by three elements: 
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• PNME, National Energy Efficiency Programme (Programme national de maîtrise de 
l’énergie) forms the legal basis of the energy law in the national energy efficiency programme 
• FNME, National Energy Efficiency Fund (Fonds national de maîtrise de l’énergie) constitutes 
the principal instrument of this programme 
• CIME, Intersectoral Energy Efficiency Committee (Comité intersectoriel de la maîtrise de 
l’énergie). This committee has been founded on 19 July 2005 as a consultative organ to 
control and evaluate the national energy programme 
4.2. Actors and Instruments in the Electricity Sector 
The following section provides a list of key players in the Algerian electricity sector:  
The National Energy Council (Conseil national de l’énergie). Founded through the presidential 
decree n°95-102 (8 April 1995), this council is charged with supervising and controlling the long-term 
national energy policy. Its mission statement underlines that it has been created to 
• put to work a long-term plan to safeguard the energy future of the country 
• follow the national energy consumption model and the long-term national strategic objectives 
• control the preservation of strategic energy reserves of the country  
• put in place long-term strategies to renew, develop and use national hydrocarbon reserves.  
In article 4 of the mentioned presidential decree, the tasks of the National Energy Council are defined. 
It is presided over by the President of the Republic and further consists of key Algerian officials, such 
as the head of government, the minister for national defence, the foreign minister, the energy minister, 
the finance minister, the governor of the Algerian central bank, and the head of the planning 
committee. 
The Ministry of Energy and Mines (Ministère de l’énergie et des mines). Headed by Minister 
Youcef Yousfi, the Ministry of Energy and Mines controls most of the technical, regulatory and 
economic aspects in the power generation sector through its directorate of electricity, and is 
responsible for the formulation and the application of a national energy policy. It also houses the 
Directorate-General for Renewable Energies. 
CREG – The Regulatory Commission of Electricity and Gas (Commission de régulation de 
l’électricité et du gaz). The national regulatory framework has been defined by law n°02-01 released 
on 5 February 2002. Articles 132 and 133 form the legal basis for the CREG. Apart from the standard 
tasks of a regulatory body, this commission observes and enforces the transparency of electricity 
markets and the well-functioning of a healthy competition. 
The Programme Committee for Investments in the Electricity and Gas Distribution Sectors (Comité 
de programmation des investissements dans les secteurs de l’électricité et de la distribution du gaz 
par canalisation). This committee has been created by the ministerial decree n°68 on 16 May 2004 as 
a result of the regrouping of the Ministry of Energy and Mines, CREG and Sonelgaz. 
The Ministry of Land Use Planning, Environment and Tourism (Ministère de l'aménagement du 
territoire, de l'environnement et du tourisme). Through its Directorate for Energy and Development, 
this ministry secures the technological aspects of the power sector and is responsible to enact laws for 
the promotion of sustainable development. 
The National Observatory for the Promotion of Renewable Energies (Observatoire national de 
promotion des énergies renouvelables). The law n°04-09 decreed on 14 August 2004 founded the 
National Observatory for the Promotion of Renewable Energies. This institution is under the authority 
of the Ministry of the Environment. The areas of competence for this agency will be defined by 
administrative order. 
CDER – The Centre for the Development of Renewable Energies (Centre de développement des 
énergies renouvelables). The centre was founded in March 1988, as a consequence of the 
restructuring of the High Commission for Research (Haut commissariat à la recherche). It elaborates 
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and implements scientific and technological R&D programmes focusing on solar, wind, geothermal 
and biomass energy. The centre’s activities range from the creation of a renewable energies Ph.D. 
programme (Ecole Doctorale) at the university of Tlemcen to the provision of an extensive virtual 
library, endowed with scientific publications and multimedia material. The CDER is based in Algiers, 
but further research and development units are deployed in the oasis of Ghardaia, in the coastal city of 
Tipaza and the in desert town of Adrar. 
IAEREE – The Algerian Institute for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (Institut algérien 
des énergies renouvelables et de l’éfficacité énergétique). Announced by President Bouteflika in 
September 2009, the IAEREE will be established in the new village of Bellil in the district of Hassi 
R’Mel (wilaya of Laghouat). The institute will work on technology and economic issues regarding the 
spread of renewable energies in Algeria and will closely cooperate with NEAL and other public and 
private sector companies (Anon. 2010a). It will also host expert courses for the construction of 
renewable energy technology and the spread of energy efficiency measures on different skill levels. 
Unlike the already existing CDER, the IAEREE will be under the supervision of the Algerian Ministry 
of Energy and Mines (Anon. 2010b), a fact that might enhance its political influence and might thus 
develop into an influential high-level renewable energy stakeholder, in the mid-term future. 
APRUE – The Algerian National Agency for the Promotion and Rationalisation of Energy Use 
(Agence nationale pour la promotion et la rationalisation de l’utilisation de l’énergie). The new 
institution was founded by law n°99-99 on energy efficiency on 28 July 1999. Originally created in 
1985 by executive decree, this institution works regarding the utilisation of natural gas, subsidising 
petroleum products and rationalising energy use according to the above-mentioned national energy 
consumption model.  
Sonelgaz – The National Society for Electricity and Gas (Socièté nationale de l'électricité et du 
gaz). Law n°02-01 on energy and gas distribution was decreed on 5 February 2002 and rearranged the 
institutional framework in the electricity sector. Since that date, the traditional operator Sonelgaz has 
been transformed into an industrial group consisting of the following seven branches: 
• Sonelgaz Electricity Production (Sonelgaz production d’électricité - SPE) 
• Electrical Grid Systems (Gestionnaire réseau de transport électricité – GRTE) 
• Gas Transport and Grid Systems (Gestionnaire réseau de transport gaz - GRTG) 
• Distribution Society for Algiers (Société de distribution d’Alger - SDA) 
• Distribution Society for Central Algeria (Société de distribution Centre - SDC) 
• Distribution Society for Eastern Algeria (Société de distribution Est - SDE) 
• Distribution Society for Western Algeria (Société de distribution Ouest - SDO) 
Independent Power Producers (IPPs). As a consequence of the liberalisation process starting in 2002, 
about 13 percent (1,200 MW) of the Algerian electricity are currently produced by private operators. 
So far, all IPPs have formed joint ventures with Sonelgaz in order to enter the Algerian power market 
(Tipaza: financed by Abu Dhabi’s Mubadala and SNC Lavalin). Skikda and Kahraba Hadjret En 
Nouss are jointly owned by Sonatrach and Sonelgaz, while the Algerian company Cevital owns two 
smaller cogeneration plants of 25 MW in the Bejaia area for its own use. 
4.3. Electricity Sector Framework 
4.3.1. History of the Electricity Sector  
The Algerian electricity sector has gone through various phases of institutional reform and 
rearrangement. To a large extent, these reforms were tailored for Sonelgaz, the national electricity and 
gas company – still the predominant actor in electricity generation, transmission and distribution. In 
recent times, innovations have brought new mechanisms to the sector, for example the admission of 
new foreign, private actors to the domestic electricity production regime. In the history of the Algerian 
electricity sector, which is mainly a history of Sonelgaz, the following phases can be identified: 
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The pre-independence phase (until 1962). Before independence, the Algerian production and 
distribution of gas and power was conducted by the Algerian Electricity and Gas Company 
(Entreprise d’électricité et du gaz d’Algérie - EGA). This enterprise had been created through the 
nationalisation of the former local power producers Lebon, Cie and SAE (Société algérienne de 
l’électricité et du gaz). Right before independence, however, law n°62-157 established EGA as a 
company with an industrial, commercial character on 31 December 1962.  
The nationalisation period and the creation of Sonelgaz. The former supplier EGA was dissolved 
by decree n°69-59 on 28 July 1969. Its successor became the Algerian Société nationale de 
l’électricité et du gaz (Sonelgaz).  
The restructuring of the electricity sector. In 1983, in accordance with other national companies, 
Sonelgaz underwent a major institutional reorganisation. This project had the goal of externalising all 
works that were on the periphery of the organisation. As a consequence, six company branches 
(Kahrif, Kharakib, Kanagaz, Inerga, Etterkib and AMC) have developed, representing different parts 
of the electricity and gas sector. 
The creation of a public enterprise of industrial and commercial character. In 1991, Sonelgaz 
changed its legal status and became a public company of industrial and commercial character (EPIC, 
établissement public à caractère industriel et commercial) by decree n°91-475 on 14 December 1991. 
The creation of the Sonelgaz SPA group. In 2002, a new electricity and gas transportation law (see 
chapter 4.3.2) brought changes to the sector, allowing private IPPs to enter the electricity generation 
business for the first time. Following this, Sonelgaz had to change its legal status and transformed into 
an industrial holding (société par actions - SPA). Today, Sonelgaz consists of various specialised 
companies (decree n°02-195, 1 June 2002) with legally unbundled activities (generation, transmission 
and distribution) As a new element of the reform, Sonelgaz SPA was also entitled to perform 
commercial operations (and equity investments) on the international level. An indicator that such 
operations actually materialise is Sonelgaz’ recent registration as a trading entity on the Spanish 
electricity exchange OMEL.  
The introduction of distribution concessions. The distribution concession regime began in 2008 by 
CREG’s declaration of decree n°08-114 on 9 April 2008. These concessions are mandatory for 
electricity and gas transports.  
Although having lost is monopolistic position, Sonelgaz has become the holder of concessions for 58 
electricity and 56 gas distribution plots and is thus undoubtedly the dominant actor in the Algerian 
national electricity scene. 
4.3.2. Current Legal Framework for Electricity 
In 2002, the Algerian government started to introduce liberalisation reforms in the domestic electricity 
sector. The objectives of the reforms were to bring the market closer to international standards and to 
open it for private investors on the basis of the principles of non-discrimination. A central outcome of 
the reform is the new gas and electricity law n°02-01 (loi n°02-01 du 5 février 2002 relative à 
l’électricité et à la distribution du gaz par canalisation), which was enacted in February 2002. It can 
be considered as the general framework law for the reorganisation of the electricity sector. Since its 
coming into force, the law has undergone several alterations in the form of decrees and additional 
implementing regulations. It has to be stressed that the implementation process is still ongoing and 
that not all of the reform efforts have been successfully performed yet.  
The electricity law n°02-01 introduced the following features to the sector:  
• The creation of an independent electricity and gas regulatory commission, in charge of 
supervising the transparency and competitiveness of the Algerian electricity and gas market 
(article 111 of the law). This commission was established in 2005 under the name Commission 
de régulation de l’électricité et du gaz (CREG). CREG has three major tasks: (1) Providing 
and controlling the public electricity service (2) Consulting the authorities about market 
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regulation and organisation, (3) Ensuring that laws and regulations are respected. CREG can 
be considered the central element of public authority in the Algerian electricity sector.  
• The opening of the power generation sector to private and public operators (articles 6 and 7). 
The law introduces competition in the electricity generation segment, by principally 
permitting any natural or legal person to install electricity generation capacities. For this 
activity, however, authorisations have to be given by CREG for installations with a capacity 
exceeding 25 MW. 
• Only the transmission system is considered a natural monopoly (article 29), being operated by 
one single grid operator. The law attributes the ownership and the utilisation of the electricity 
transmission grid to the grid operator GRTE, Gestionnaire réseau de transport électricité, a 
subsidiary of the Sonelgaz group (article 169). 
• Concessions for electricity distribution shall be given out by CREG following a public tender 
process (article 73). Details are outlined in decree n°08-114. Although private actors in the 
electricity distribution business are principally admissible, currently, all distribution 
companies are owned by Sonelgaz. Sonelgaz’ distribution companies are: Société de 
distribution d’Alger (SDA), Société de distribution Centre (SDC), Société de distribution Est 
(SDE) and Société de distribution Ouest (SDO). 
• The law envisages the creation of an independent system operator (article 35), responsible for 
the dispatching of the electricity (supply-demand equilibrium). The system operator shall be 
an independent commercial company. However, at present, the system operation is still 
performed by Sonelgaz (article 172).  
• The law also stipulates the creation of an independent “market regulator” (opérateur du 
marché) organising the commercial electricity trading (articles 41 and 42). This agency shall 
be in the hands of a commercial company and in charge of handling the market operations and 
of communicating the obtained (marginal) market prices to the market participants. 
As of now, such a market operator has not yet been introduced, and the law remains unclear 
about the details how the electricity trading is to be organised (e.g. whether the market 
operator will become an equivalent to electricity trading platforms in Europe). At the moment, 
the tasks of a market regulator are carried out by Sonelgaz (article 172). 
• Article 85 of the law explicitly allows the export and import of electricity, which can be 
performed by any legal or natural person. International electricity transactions have to be 
confirmed by the regulatory commission (CREG), which can refuse export activities if they 
have strongly negative impacts on the national Algerian electricity supply (i.e. if demand 
cannot be satisfied). Power plants that have been constructed exclusively for export of 
electricity are exempted from this reservation (article 86) – a clause that opens a legal door for 
pure export projects, such as Desertec.  
4.3.3. Impact and Consequences for Electricity Export 
In the years following 2002, the new law has caused small, but already visible changes in the 
electricity landscape of Algeria. Although the state company Sonelgaz still holds a (quasi-)monopoly 
on grid use and electricity distribution, it had to perform a legal unbundling of its business units 
(generation, transmission and distribution) in order to comply with the new requirements set by the 
electricity legislation. A further, similarly remarkable sign is the emergence of private IPPs, which 
have already been listed in the previous chapter: The law n°02-01 has helped to launch various 
projects of independent power producers, most of which are owned by joint ventures or consortia of 
several investors, including international participation. An example for an IPP project was the 2005 
gas power plant in Kahrama with 80 percent equity participation of the US company Blach &Veach.  
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In the renewable sector, a first major engagement of the international (private) power sector has been 
made for the solar thermal power plant (SPP1) in Hassi R’mel, which is currently under construction 
by a consortium of Algerian companies (Sonatrach and NEAL) and the Spanish ABENER group.  
Despite these first signs of a partial liberalisation and opening for foreign investments, the situation of 
the Algerian electricity market is still far away from being fully open to outsiders. One major obstacle 
for private investors is the restrictive procedures for planning permissions of new power plants.  
As Fig. 4-1 indicates, any new plant has to be authorised either by CREG or the Ministry of Energy. 
Exceptions are only made in case of plants that generate electricity for the owner’s own demand 
(French autoconsommation) and that are smaller than 25 MW. In this case, a simple note to CREG is 
sufficient. Set aside this exception, it can be stated that for all large-scale electricity generation 
projects, the right to access the Algerian electricity grid is still restricted. Investors depend on the 
consent of the electricity regulator or the Ministry of Energy. This is also the case for export-oriented 
renewable power plants.  
 
Fig. 4-1. Authorisation procedures for new and existing power plants. CREG, no year. 
A further regulatory barrier concerns the transmission network. If, for example, renewable electricity, 
generated by private-owned solar plants in central Algeria, should be transported towards export hubs 
at the coastline via the national Algerian grid (see Fig. 3-7), part of the Algerian overland transmission 
capacities would have to be reserved for this power export. These capacities would have to be 
assigned by the grid monopolist (Sonelgaz GRTE) to the exporting company. A problem would arise if 
bottlenecks put physical limitations to the transmission of the additional (renewable) power 
transported through the domestic grid. In this case, an upgrade of the Algerian grid infrastructure for 
export purposes would be required. Such grid extensions, however, will be difficult to realise for two 
reasons: (1) the grid operator has no obligation to carry out investments for new transmission capacity 
that is not essentially needed for the national Algerian power supply, (2) third parties are not allowed 
to invest in the Algerian grid infrastructure due to the monopolistic structures provided by the 
electricity law.  
For the direct export option (see Fig. 3-6), where the investor builds his own electricity transmission 
system without connection to the Algerian grid, the situation appears to be somewhat different. In that 
case, both the generation and the transmission infrastructure would be completely isolated from the 
Algerian electricity supply scheme and would therefore not interfere with the provision of public 
service. However, at the moment, the law on electricity n°02-01 of 5 February 2002 concerning 
electricity and gas distribution via a pipeline network does not allow national and foreign entities to 
own transmission lines destined exclusively for export. The use of transportation grids for electricity 
and gas via a pipeline system is still exclusively entrusted to the national grid administrator 
GRTE/GRTG (part of the Sonelgaz group). Whether this means that the electricity law does not apply 
for these projects, is unclear. 
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4.4. The Renewable Energy Framework 
4.4.1. Legislative Provisions for Renewable Energies 
From the 1980s until the year 2000, renewable energies in Algeria were regarded as part of the 
country’s energy utilisation and efficiency strategy, rather than being seen as environmental protection 
measures, which is the case today. In 2001 and 2003, two environmental laws (law n°01-20 of 12 
December 2001 and law n°03-10 of 19 July 2003) implicitly referred to renewable energies.  
An explicit legal support of renewable energies came into force in 2004, when Algeria’s first 
renewable energy law was enacted (law n°04-09 of 14 August 2004, “loi relative à la promotion des 
énergies renouvelables dans le cadre du développement durable”, “law on the promotion of renewable 
energies in the context of sustainable development”). This law provides a general framework for a 
national promotion programme for renewable energies. Moreover, the law foresees the creation of the 
above-mentioned monitoring body (Observatoire national de promotion des energies renouvelables). 
A further element of the law is the introduction of a renewable certificate system. As of now, the 
realisation of this certificate system, as well as the monitoring body, are still pending.  
4.4.2. Feed-in Tariffs 
Independently of the above-mentioned renewable energy laws, in 2004, a decree on the diversification 
of electricity production (executive decree n°04-92 of 25 March 2004) was enacted by the Algerian 
government. The objective of the decree is to create incentives for other sources of electricity 
generation than the conventional ones. At the time of release, the decree was unique in Africa: for the 
first time, a precisely defined remuneration scheme for renewable electricity had been set out on the 
continent. 
In detail, the decree defines technology-specific premiums that the electricity producer receives per 
kWh of renewable power injected into the grid. 
In greater detail, the decree envisages the following bonuses, which are paid on top of the market 
electricity price:  
• For wind electricity the bonus is 300 percent 
• For solar electricity entirely produced by solar irradiation (e.g. PV or “solar only” CSP 
plants), the bonus is 300 percent 
• For solar thermal electricity with gas co-firing the bonus is 
• 180 percent for a solar contribution of 20 percent to 25 percent 
• 160 percent for a solar contribution of 15 percent to 20 percent 
• 140 percent for a solar contribution of 10 percent to 15 percent 
• 100 percent for a solar contribution of 5 percent to 10 percent 
• 0 percent for a solar contribution of 0 percent to 5 percent 
• For hydroelectricity, the bonus is 100 percent 
• For cogeneration plants, the bonus is 160 percent 
• For waste incineration plants, the bonus is 200 percent 
In combination with the obligation of the grid owner to allow third parties the access to the 
transmission grid (under the conditions set out by the electricity law n°02-01, 2001, see previous 
chapter), the decree can be considered as a feed-in law in the formal sense. 
Nevertheless, it has to be stressed that the feed-in mechanisms have so far not succeeded in triggering 
any significant deployment of renewable energies in Algeria. The main reason is that until today, the 
definition of the base price (upon which the calculation of the feed-in bonuses is based) is pending. 
Consequently, it is unsurprising that uncertainty about return on investments forms a major 
disincentive for large-scale investors in renewable energies in Algeria. Moreover, due to the 
subsidised electricity generation (most power plants are operated with cheap gas supplied by the 
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national gas company Sonatrach), the base price for electricity can be expected to be very low. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that the current remuneration scheme will lead to major investments in 
renewable capacity in Algeria. 
As Algerian authorities are aware of the fact that so far, its attempts to incentivise renewable energy 
investments have been of very limited success, a reformulation of its renewable energy law is 
currently under discussion, but it might take several years until its release. In order to bridge the gap 
for the time being, the 2010 financial law (“loi de finances 2010”) envisages the creation of a new, 
special renewable energy investment fund. Financed by a 0.5 percent fee of the corporate oil taxes 
(fiscalité petrolière), this vehicle will have an estimated amount of €40 million p.a. at its command. 
One of its first projects will be the co-financing of Algeria’s first wind park in Adrar that will be built 
by the French company Vergnet.  
In sum, although renewable incentives in form of feed-in tariffs formally exist in Algeria, the 
country’s current legal framework has so far not been able to render renewable energies attractive for 
investors. As of now, the few renewable power plant projects in the country have only received 
funding through subsidies or cross-financing with Algerian public funds or international development 
finance. It remains to be seen whether Algeria’s new renewable energy investment fund or a future 
redraft of its legislation will yield more positive results. For now, however, the renewable export 
option will remain the only attractive investment opportunity. Only in the (unlikely) case that 
Algeria‘s government decides to raise its feed-in tariffs above the potential primes paid by European 
countries, investors would switch to set up renewable plants for local supply.  
4.5. The Entrepreneurial Framework 
4.5.1. The Situation for Foreign Investors 
As has been outlined in chapter 4.2.2., Algeria’s electricity market is open to any third party 
investment, be it domestic or foreign. Despite this formal liberalisation of the electricity sector, the 
Algerian government has recently set up a serious barrier regarding the general equity participation of 
foreign capital in Algerian companies. Since 2009, the new law of finances  stipulates that foreign 
investors can only hold up to 49 percent of the capital of an Algerian company(article n°58). All 
foreign investment activities have to be declared at the National Investment Agency ANDI (Agence 
nationale de développement de l’investissement) and receive approval of the National Council of 
Investments (CNI, Conseil national de l’investissement). Also, the repatriation of profits, a key aspect 
for international investors, might prove difficult: although formally possible, companies are 
encouraged to reinvest their revenues in Algeria and receive a preferential tax rate. This, however, will 
not be of key interest for international shareholder-oriented companies. It is currently unclear whether 
this could deter large-scale renewable energy exporters or whether, like in the case of the oil industry, 
where the local content factor is not a new situation either, the business is still so attractive that 
investors are undeterred by those potential administrative issues.  
Presently, it is difficult to anticipate the consequences of this investment restriction (before the law 
came into force, foreign companies were allowed to hold majorities in Algerian companies). At least 
for large-scale export projects following the direct export scenario (see chapter 3.5.3), the stipulation 
of an obligatory Algerian majority seems to represent a barrier: 
(1) Even though powerful state-owned industrial companies exist, it might be generally difficult to 
find Algerian investors that are able to raise the majority of the massive investments needed to set up 
the electricity generation and transport infrastructure. (2) Moreover, domestic investors might be 
reluctant to put an equity majority into an enterprise whose only revenue basis depends on European 
subsidies for imported renewable electricity.  
4.5.2. The Situation for Algerian Investors and Possible Partnership Frameworks 
Also from the standpoint of Algerian investors, barriers exist, particularly in the case of the direct 
export scenario. As indicated in the previous chapter, the main obstacle for investing in a new export-
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oriented transmission project will be the commercial risk for Algerian investors or lenders. They 
would want certainty about future cash flows, which are determined by quantities to be sold and future 
electricity prices. Both can only be provided via long-term contracts. An example of these contracts 
are take-or-pay contracts which are common practice in international gas business. They are also 
applied to existing or new pipeline projects between Algeria, Spain and Italy. Take-or-pay contracts 
for electricity transmission lines would guarantee electricity sales at steady price levels – the buyer has 
to pay the contractual amount of electricity even if demand falls short. A further trust-enhancing 
measure would be investment partnerships with the European downstream electricity sector. Here, the 
Algerian gas sector could serve as an example, too. The Medgaz project, a new trans-Mediterranean 
pipeline running from Algeria to Spain, involves five international operators from both the upstream 
and the downstream business. A similar setup could be imagined for investment-intensive HVDC 
transmission lines across the Mediterranean. Here, consortia of Algerian power (generation) 
companies, as well as European electricity traders could initiate powerful and successful partnerships.  
4.5.3. Taxation and Export Duties 
At present, no specific legal documents concerning the taxation and export duties for renewable 
electricity have been published. 
4.5.4. Land Rights and Ownership 
Land rights and ownership might become an issue for renewable power projects, particularly for area-
intensive CSP or PV power plants. According to the Dii, an area of 17,000 square kilometres would be 
required to produce “green” power on the desired scale for the EU (Rhodes 2010). It is currently 
assumed that the land purchase or land ownership issues fall under the regulation of industrial land, 
mediated by the Algerian Agence nationale d’intermédiation et de régulation foncière (ANIREF, 
National Agency for Land Intermediation and Regulation). Land rights will be issued by concession 
tenders where the highest bidder in a public auction wins.  
4.6. Summary 
The Algerian electricity market is on a path of privatisation and liberalisation to bring its market closer 
to international standards.  
From a general standpoint, there are no legal regulations prohibiting the export of (renewable) 
electricity. As has been shown, export activities are explicitly allowed by the Algerian electricity law – 
even for private, foreign IPPs. However, when looking at the details, one can at best be cautiously 
optimistic because of several reasons:  
- Authorities can hamper potential renewable export projects of third parties as there is the 
requirement of a formal permission by the regulatory commission for each new power plant 
over 25 MW. 
- There is uncertainty about the allocation of sufficient transmission capacity, which lies in the 
hands of the grid operator and the regulatory commission. This results from the fact that the 
transmission system for electricity is supposed to be a natural monopoly. 
- The grid monopolist has no obligation to modernise or extend the existing grid to ensure the 
physical ability to export electricity, and private companies are not allowed to invest in such 
infrastructure. 
- Transmission lines for export purposes only must not be owned by private entities (which is 
currently relevant in the natural gas sector). 
- Currently, there are no sufficient support systems for renewable energies that would be able to 
bridge the gap from now to a stage in which renewable electricity can be sold to Europe. 
- The new law of finances passed in 2009 (article 58) stipulates that foreign investors can only 
hold up to 49 percent of the capital of an Algerian company. Also, the repatriation of profits, a 
key aspect for international investors, might prove difficult: although formally possible, 
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companies are encouraged to reinvest their revenues in Algeria. This, however, will not be of 
key interest for international shareholder-oriented companies. 
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5. Players in the Algerian Electricity and Renewable Energy Sector 
The previous chapter has shown that renewable energies have taken first roots in some areas of the 
Algerian legal framework. Important regulatory barriers, however, still remain, especially with regards 
to the large-scale export of renewable electricity. How (and if) these barriers can be overcome will 
finally depend on the Algerian government’s attitude and actions. Although it is beyond the scope of 
this work to analyse in detail the governance processes in the Algerian (renewable) energy policy 
arena, we nevertheless want to give an overview of the main actors and stakeholders that might 
influence future discussions.  
The first section of this chapter analyses the current state of the Algerian discourse about renewable 
energies in a general way, while the second part describes more specifically the positions of the actors 
regarding the question of electricity export.  
5.1. The Algerian Discourse on Renewable Energies - Interest Groups 
and Their Arguments 
The last ten years have been marked by profound transformations in the way renewable energies have 
been received within socio-political discussions in Algeria. Previously, the country, as a „prisoner of 
fossil fuels“, had for a long time discarded renewable energies in its energy policy discourse. Today, 
this situation has changed and it appears that most of the concerned actors perceive Algeria’s strong 
fossil focus as a general risk that might weaken the country’s position in the long run. Among the 
crucial questions, which are currently debated, are: 
• Which are the future equilibriums in terms of internal energy consumption? 
• Which diversification of energies should be adopted? 
• Should priority be given to export? 
• What is the position of renewable energies in the context of internal consumption and in the 
light of large-scale development projects (five-year plans, industrial development programmes 
and the national land use plan SNAT (schéma national d’aménagement du territoire))  
Over the past years, different types of discourse have emanated in Algeria. Each type is represented by 
a distinct group of protagonists. In order to distinguish the different positions, we have classified the 
positions of the actors into four main discourse types:  
• The nationalist discourse 
• The utilitarian discourse 
• The environmentalist and civil society discourse 
• The business discourse 
The nature and the arguments of these discourses are briefly outlined in the following sections.  
5.1.1. The Nationalist Discourse 
This discourse is probably the most influential, as it is shared by the Directorate-General for 
Electricity of the Ministry of Energy and Mines and the regulatory commission CREG. Since the 
energy sector is regarded as extremely sensitive, these actors consider that it touches upon national 
sovereignty. As a consequence, the sector cannot be the object of market relations in the classical 
sense, for its administration must take place in a ”special” framework. The advocates of this discourse 
expect a clear formulation of an affirmative policy regarding renewable energies. However, they do 
not conceal that they consider the deployment of renewable energy technologies rather as secondary. 
The proponents consider the following facts as given: 
• National fossil fuels are sufficient in the long run. 
• Natural gas, Algeria’s dominating energy resource, is considered the least polluting among 
fossil fuels. 
 Wuppertal Institute, CREAD         42 
• On the one hand, Algeria does not consider itself a polluter and is hence in a less pressing 
situation than other countries; on the other hand, disposing of a large range of options in the 
domain of renewable energies, Algeria is concerned about the valorisation of its resources and 
the elaboration of a strategy in both the regional and the international context. 
The advocates of the nationalist discourse, particularly the regulatory commission CREG, seem to 
prioritise the organisation of an electricity sector as prescribed by the 2002 electricity law (see chapter 
4.3.2). Compared to this, strengthening the renewable electricity legislation, for example by 
formulating the long-awaited application texts to the 2004 renewable energy law, appears to be of 
minor importance. A reason for this reluctance on the part of the advocates of the nationalist discourse 
might be the frequently voiced  concerns about the stability of electricity prices and the question how 
renewable technologies could provide added value for the Algerian economy.  
One project that could be attractive to proponents of this discourse is the new attempt to establish a 
photovoltaic industry in Algeria. Thus, Sonelgaz’ engineering branch CEEG has recently announced 
that it would begin the domestic production of photovoltaic modules no later than in September 2012 
with its company Rouiba Eclairage (Bouazid 2010). However, it remains doubtful whether a 
comparatively small production line (30-45 MW) will be cost-competitive with the large-scale 
manufacturing facilities that have been built in Asia.  
5.1.2. The Utilitarian Discourse 
Advocates of the utilitarian discourse are the electricity service provider Sonelgaz as well as several 
national agencies that are in charge of carrying out government renewable energy programmes, such 
as APRUE or CDER. All these actors are characterised by a slightly technocratic and normative vision 
regarding the energy sector and are hence concerned with a strict compliance with their duties. 
CDER and APRUE were established to promote renewable energies or energy efficiency measures in 
front of the general public. In other words, they are in charge of launching and following up on pilot 
projects and of organising activities to sensitise public opinion to “green“ culture (solar villages, use 
of energy-saving lamps). CDER is a research centre focusing on technology and natural potentials for 
renewable energies in Algeria. Both APRUE and CDER position themselves on the future market for 
renewable energies – of which they already seem to be the precursors in Algeria – by approaching 
universities and research centres in order to render research and development in this domain more 
dynamic.  
Sonelgaz, which has long experience in the management of conventional electricity, shows a reserved 
attitude towards renewable energies. Its interest in renewable energies will only increase in case of an 
implementation strategy that is in line with the company’s main mission: the continuous and stable 
provision of electricity. Due to their high costs and their intermittent power feed-in, Sonelgaz’ 
representatives do at the moment not consider renewable energies as one of their company’s major 
fields of activity. However, this might change in future, also with the help of the planned photovoltaic 
manufacturing project of the Sonelgaz group. 
As can be seen in the case of APRUE, some actors can be attributed to more than just one discourse. 
This results from their broad approach to renewable energies. Therefore, APRUE will be treated as an 
actor of the ecologist discourse in the following subchapter. 
5.1.3. The Ecological and Civil Society Discourse and the Role of the Media 
The ecological discourse emanates from a broad range of actors. While in a European context, one 
would typically expect environmental associations to be its central advocates, in Algeria, this is only 
the case to a certain extent as environmentalist civil society organisations are rather weak. Thus, 
public institutions gain in relative importance; particularly the Ministry for Spatial Planning and 
Environment should be considered a central stakeholder within this kind of discourse. As will be 
indicated, further actors comprise the civil society organisations and the media, whereas political 
parties seem indifferent to ecological concerns.  
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The Ministry for Spatial Planning and Environment 
The Ministry regrets that issues in the energy sector are still badly placed on the hierarchy of national 
sustainability priorities; they have not yet been sufficiently considered in the development of long-
term strategies for the national energy future. These issues are masked by a superficial vision that 
privileges the short term and suggests energetic ease and abundance. Consequently, fossil energies are 
used wastefully and irrationally. Environmentalists assert that all scenarios, even the most prudent 
ones, predict an increase in national energy consumption imposed by socio-economic developments 
with strong external effects on the environment, namely pollution. Renewable energies are regarded as 
the only reliable and sensible alternative for the environment and sustainable development in the long 
term. The notion that the visions of the Ministry of the Environment differ strongly from those of the 
MEM can be further backed up by the project Nouvelle Ville Boughezoul, the plan of a Masdar-style 
zero-carbon city that has been put forth by the Ministry of Environment. Without assessing the 
likelihood of success of the project as a whole, it can be underlined that such a project is in many ways 
diametrically opposed to what conservative development plans of the MEM stand for. 
This discourse in favour of renewable energies links the Algerian situation to a supranational 
challenge comprising the whole African continent and points out the paradox of the present situation. 
The African continent is the geographical region that pollutes the least, but it is the area that bears the 
most dramatic effects for its development and its populations.  
Civil Society Organisations 
Due to recent Algerian history with the civil war from 1991 until 1998 and its aftermath, 
environmental questions are not accorded the highest priority among societal issues in Algeria. 
Officially registered ecological movements constitute only 3 percent of all 962 national associations 
and struggle with fluctuating mobilisation potentials, which often do not allow them to react 
appropriately to current environmental concerns. Still, the movement has known some successes, like 
the large-scale mobilisation preventing the route of the east-west highway from disfiguring the scenery 
of El Kala Park, classified UNESCO world heritage. Thus, the associational movement is perceived as 
the actor that is able to translate global environmental culture into its local variety. The association 
Bariq 21, for instance, aims at sensitising the population to renewable energies and sustainable 
development. Its activists have recently donated the first solar water heater for a local day nursery, 
hoping to contribute to the spread of renewable energies. Similarly, the association El-Baraim seeks to 
educate kids to (eco-) citizenship from a young age, organising eco-awareness workshops in 
kindergartens and primary schools. As can be gauged by those examples, however, most Algerian 
environmental civil society organisations do not have command of large organisational capacities in 
order to run large-scale campaigns for renewable energies and focus more on local or regional 
awareness building projects than on the sensitive issue of national policy-making. 
The Media: a Daily Discourse with Educational Tendency 
It is important to emphasise that in Algeria the media discourse on renewable energies contains a 
strong educational element of green culture. The media position themselves as the mouthpiece of the 
associational movement and distinguish themselves through their efforts to mobilise public opinion 
concerning sensitive questions of environment, ecology, pollution and renewable energies.  
Political Parties 
The political parties seem to a certain extent detached from the big ecological events and the issues at 
stake. At the moment, they mobilise all their capacities in order to assure a better rootedness in society 
and to acquire more visibility in the Algerian political landscape. Most parties advocate a more 
traditional, materialistic development model for the Algerian society and favour non-environmental 
topics for mobilisation campaigns. That said, also the Algerian political landscape slowly takes 
environmental issues into account and increases interaction with global environmental movements. In 
terms of renewable energies, it can be expected that once the national programme on renewable 
energies is better established, political organisations will increasingly discover the domestic and 
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international renewable energy agenda as well. The major political parties that are represented in the 
Algerian People’s National Assembly are the ruling National Liberation Front (136 seats, left-wing) 
of president Bouteflika, the National Rally for Democracy (61, left-wing), the Movement of Society for 
Peace (52, Islamist), the Workers’ Party (26, far-left) and the Rally for Culture and Democracy (19, 
secular-liberal Berber party). Further, there are 33 independent deputies and 17 minor parties, among 
them the National Movement for Nature and Development with seven deputies. 
5.1.4. The Business Discourse 
This group of actors forcefully demands state patronage for pre-investments in renewable energies, 
such as the abolition of restrictions, the reduction of regimentation, the access to land and the 
facilitation of the construction of a new market for renewable energies. 
Essentially, the strategy of this group consists of organising its immediate immersion in the 
international power sector. Proponents (e.g. Cevital) aim to position themselves as an intermediary 
platform necessary for the megaprojects planned on the southern shore of the Mediterranean, 
especially for the export of electricity generated from renewables. 
The immediate objective of these actors is to seek facilitation for the discharge of their overproduction 
onto the local or international markets, but also to position themselves well within export circuits for 
the sale of renewable energies on the national and global market. Hence, they have shown the will to 
be present in the sectors of both conventional and renewable energies. 
These actors retain a critical stance vis-à-vis the regulation in force in this field. Indeed, they regard it 
as non-conform with the declared will of the state to liberalise the economy. They consider that this 
regimentation contains some obstacles for the comprehensive application of the laws on economic 
liberalisation that have been promulgated. Thus, they emphasise the absence of a transparent 
remuneration scheme and the delays in the effective implementation of a market operator. 
5.2. The Position of Algerian Stakeholders with Regards to Renewable 
Power Export Schemes 
The interviews with the Algerian stakeholders were conducted in Mai and June 2010. Not all of the 
questions asked concerning renewable electricity exports were welcomed by the interviewed actors. 
Particularly the interview with the Directorate-General of Electricity of the Algerian MEM, turned out 
to be fruitless as it explicitly refused to answer direct questions about the Desertec initiative and 
generally about other potential renewable energy export projects. This indicates that electricity export 
continues to be a sensitive area of Algerian energy policy. There are also different opinions within the 
Algerian government regarding the issue.  
5.2.1. The Position of the Advocates of the Nationalist Discourse 
The nationalist discourse, mainly expressed by the MEM, but also by the regulatory agency CREG, is 
characterised by general scepticism towards renewable electricity export projects, particularly those 
promoted by private initiatives. The Desertec project, for instance, was declared as “not officially 
existent” by the central authorities advocating this discourse. One of the first press statements made by 
the former energy minister Chakib Khelil – as a direct reaction to the Desertec announcement in July 
2009 – illustrates the reservation of this important institution very well:  
”We have a clear policy with regards to solar energy. The precondition is that there is a 
partnership between Algerian and foreign companies and that there is a technology 
transfer in the area of engineering, manufacturing and construction. If these conditions 
are not fulfilled, we are not interested. [...]. We don’t want foreign companies to exploit 
our solar energy resources.” (Algérius 2009, own translation) 
Likewise, Khelil’s successor Youcef Yousfi showed suspicion towards the Desertec project and 
declared on 25 July 2010 that Algeria intended to realise larger projects own its own. According to the 
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news site Algérie 360, Algerian concerns regarding Desertec are focussing on sovereignty over 
planned foreign-owned installations and to the long project duration (Algérie 360 2010). 
A similar attitude was reiterated during talks with representatives of the ministry: renewable electricity 
exports are only perceived positively as long as they promise perspectives of a real technology transfer 
within an equitable framework partnership with foreign players. Moreover, the advocates of the 
nationalist discourse do not see any major reasons why renewable export projects should – at the 
moment – be given priority in the Algerian energy policy. At the most, if electricity surpluses occur, 
occasional exports can be performed to neighbouring countries on a “complementary” basis. The 
actors declared themselves “not favourable” to proposals of a direct export scheme (solar and wind 
power plants exclusively built for export via separate electricity export lines). Representatives of the 
regulatory agency added that as far as independent export was concerned, the legal texts currently in 
force excluded ownership of transmission lines by third parties.  
We could discern a slightly more favourable attitude among the stakeholders regarding the domestic 
integration of renewable energies and the export of electricity surpluses. Nevertheless, the actors 
mentioned the following administrative and political preconditions for the introduction of such an 
export scheme:  
• It is necessary to create a tool that distinguishes between fossil-generated and renewable 
electricity. 
• There should be coherent remuneration schemes for the different market sectors that take into 
account the cost of the different renewable energy technologies. 
• There has to be a grid upgrade providing sufficient capacity and flexibility for the integration 
of the surplus of renewable energies 
In addition to that, as a main political precondition, the actors argued for a clearly defined 
transnational electricity framework agreement including the Maghreb as well as other countries of the 
Euro-Mediterranean region. 
As MEM is responsible for fossil fuels as well, it is possible that a certain conflict between MEM-
internal interests arises. On the one side proponents of the increased utilisation of fossil fuels, mainly 
natural gas as an export good, could try to slow down the introduction of renewable energies. This 
could provoke a reaction on the other side, namely on the side of proponents of renewable energies 
would start to work against MEM-internal plans for fossil fuels.  
5.2.2. The Position of the Advocates of the Utilitarian Discourse 
Here, interviews were carried out with the electric utility Sonelgaz and its R&D subsidiary CREDEG 
(Centre de recherche et de développement de l’électricité et du gaz; Centre for Research and 
Development of Electricity and Gas). To a large extent, the utility’s opinion matches the nationalist 
discourse advocated by the MEM and the electricity regulator. This particularly holds for the utility’s 
reservation regarding direct export schemes where renewable generation is isolated from the domestic 
supply scheme. Sonelgaz, as a player in charge of securing continuous electricity supply, 
understandably favours domestic consumption of renewable power, while export is a secondary issue, 
considered only if surpluses occur. The export of this residual power, however, is regarded as unlikely 
due to the high internal demand growth expected for the next years. 
In terms of transnational power exchange, Sonelgaz stresses the importance of balancing power 
exchanges within the neighbouring COMELEC (Comité maghrébin d’électricité; the Electricity 
Committee of the Arab Maghreb Union) countries. 
5.2.3. The Position of the Advocates of the Ecological and Civil Society Discourse 
and of the Media 
The ecological discourse is mostly advocated by a group of actors ranging from institutions like the 
Ministry for Spatial Planning and Environment and APRUE to the press and civil society. These 
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different proponents of the ecological discourse have slightly different approaches to and outlooks on 
the export of renewable electricity. 
Institutional actors 
Concerning the institutional actors, there is a slight inconsistency between their stated aims and 
interests and their concrete attitude towards energy exportation projects. While the Ministry for 
Environment and APRUE intend to reduce CO2 emissions and promote renewable energies, they are 
not favourable to ventures like Desertec or to any export of renewable energies. Accordingly, spatial 
planning does not provide any land or infrastructure for such projects. As can be expected from an 
institutional actor, priority is given to Algerian interests, which means welcoming domestic 
photovoltaic projects and hoping for positive effects on human capacity building and job creation, 
while taking up a critical stance on foreign investments. Consequently, if this actor is to be convinced 
of Desertec, it is necessary to engage in a careful dialogue, reassuring him about possible negative 
environmental effects of large-scale energy projects and ensuring direct benefits for Algeria in terms 
of vocational training and development for the southern areas.  
Civil Society Organisations 
Regarding Algerian civil society, there does not seem to be great awareness of or concern for 
transnational renewable electricity export plans like Desertec or the MSP. Still, there are some 
exceptions to that rule, such as a Facebook group called “Let’s be eco-responsible“, where critical 
minds question the role of the state in the promotion of renewable energies in a thread entitled “Solar 
energy, stakes and applications of a clean and inexhaustible source of energy”. Even though Desertec 
is not explicitly mentioned, users regret the „lack of a vision among politicians, which is blocking the 
country“ (Facebook 2010). 
The Media 
Regarding the Algerian press, as a general tendency it covers the Desertec project in a quite 
descriptive manner, focusing on facts and figures rather than giving its opinion about it. Still, it is 
possible to discern a prevailing twofold attitude towards the project: On the one hand, Desertec is 
carefully appreciated and perceived as an asset for energy-exporting Algeria; on the other, there is 
awareness of the obstacles that the project still faces. Other projects, such as the MSP or the newly 
founded Transgreen consortium, have so far found the attention of Algerian national media only on 
rare occasions. 
According to the business journal Le Maghreb, Desertec contributes to the development of its host 
countries, creating jobs and allowing for the construction of desalination plants (Larabi 2010). Apart 
from these very concrete benefits, Desertec is also perceived as a strategic asset for Algeria’s energy 
future. Thus, Le Maghreb asserts that the Algerian solar potential lies at the heart of a (European) 
energy transition (Samira G., 2010a) and that the firms participating in Desertec are provided with 
unique chances to create business relations and partnerships (Samira G. 2010b), which will be useful 
in a future that „takes place in the south“ (Yacine B. 2008). Along the same lines, Liberté claims that 
Desertec could help Algeria maintain the considerable weight it has as a provider of energy if the state 
embraced this project (Khaled R. 2010). 
However, the Algerian press is also aware of the obstacles facing the Desertec project. First, this 
concerns possible difficulties with Algerian authorities, which have yet to be convinced of the project 
(Samira G. 2009a, 2009b). Second, some journalists expect Europe to actively help Algeria establish 
itself on the renewable energies scene by granting it access to European electricity markets (Salami 
2010) and by ensuring an energy partnership on an equal basis, with technology transfers and local 
manufacturing of equipment (Khaled R. 2010). Finally, further problems related to Desertec include 
the threat of rising energy prices in Algeria as a result of a harmonisation of energy prices among 
Maghreb countries as well as the challenge of human capacity building posed by a project of that scale 
(ibid.). 
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Overall, the proponents of the ecological discourse seem more prone to accepting a project like 
Desertec than the “utilitarian” or “nationalist” actors. Hence, the environmentalists are the ones that 
need to be addressed and convinced of energy exportation projects because actors like the Ministry for 
Spatial Planning and Environment could possibly serve as an intermediary with other state institutions 
like the MEM. 
The things said about the Desertec initiative can mainly be generalised to renewable electricity export 
schemes as such. 
5.2.4. The Position of the Advocates of the Business Discourse 
The main actor among the advocates of the business discourse is the Algerian agro-business group 
Cevital, a founding member of the Desertec Industrial Initiative. Cevital’s main interest concerning 
Desertec is to act as a principal player on the production side and as an intermediary between foreign 
investors and local firms. As a private company, Cevital is not primarily concerned with questions of 
public and national welfare, but prioritises business interests. Hence, unlike the aforementioned 
players, Cevital is favourable to the export of renewable energies and the establishment of an 
independent grid for electricity export, even preferring this option to domestic use. Further, Cevital is 
convinced that Algeria as a country could benefit from projects like Desertec through transfer of 
technology and know-how. Yet, Cevital also perceives some difficulties regarding the implementation 
of an energy export scheme and calls upon the Algerian state to respond to these. The following 
elements are considered as prerequisites for any export project:  
• The institution of a market operator 
• The development of a remuneration scheme 
• The enhancement of regimentation 
• The traceability of electricity from its source 
• The development of a grid with upgrade capacities and the flexibility to integrate the surplus 
of renewable energies 
• Grid access for the private sector 
• Compliance with regulatory texts on behalf of IPPs 
• Clarification of the interstate partnership frameworks (Maghreb and Euro-Mediterranean) 
5.3. Summary 
In the nationalist discourse, mainly represented by the CREG and the Ministry of Energy and Mines, 
renewable electricity export schemes are seen with scepticism. Algeria tries to make the most of its 
bargaining position as a potential site of renewable electricity: Renewable energy exports driven by 
foreign investors are only accepted if Algerian players can strongly participate via local content, 
technology transfer and value chain advantages. Whether such gains can be realised in the current 
Algerian industry infrastructures is not discussed among the Algerian players. Direct export schemes 
are not favoured by the representatives of the nationalist discourse, they only see exports as an 
additional option to domestic supply. 
Moreover, the actors argue for a clearly defined transnational electricity framework agreement 
including the Maghreb as well as other countries of the Euro-Mediterranean region 
The representatives of the utilitarian discourse, Sonelgaz and the CREDEG, share the position of the 
CREG and the MEM. In general, we noticed the absence of a reflection focused on administrative 
facilitation for investments in the green sector. Indeed, the state considers investment in the renewable 
energy sector just like classical industrial investment. There are no formalities or specific procedures 
for investment in renewable energies. 
The actors within the ecological and civil society discourse favour renewable energies but are 
sceptical about private export schemes like Desertec as they fear that national Algerian interests – job 
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creation, welfare, etc. – could be neglected. Currently, there is almost no knowledge about renewable 
electricity export schemes among the Algerian civil society.  
The Algerian media cover the export topic – mostly discussed under the term and approach Desertec – 
in a more or less descriptive style, being neither too much for nor too much against such plans. 
Aspects like renewable electricity export structures as “strategic assets“ for the Algerian state are 
discussed in a similar way.  
One of the largest Algerian companies, Cevital, is strongly in favour of Desertec and renewable 
energy export schemes. More so, Cevital is a member of the Dii. Cevital calls upon the Algerian state 
to create favourable conditions for export schemes.  
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6. Conclusions and Open Questions for Further Research 
6.1. Relevant Questions Regarding Feasibility from an Algerian 
Perspective 
The project yielded several new insights that have to be taken into consideration in the context of the 
establishment of transcontinental renewable electricity infrastructures.  
The major actors within the Algerian debate see domestic development goals as prerequisites for the 
realisation of such structures. Among these goals are: 
• creation of jobs in the Algerian economy 
• establishment of a domestic renewable energy industry 
• transfer of know-how and technologies from Europe to Algeria 
Sometimes these preconditions are presented in a somewhat harsh way, e.g. by the MEM, as it was 
done by the former energy minister Chakib Khelil, who reached the following conclusion: “We don’t 
want foreign companies to exploit our solar energy resources.” It remains to be discussed whether 
such blunt statements are suited to create a climate of mutual trust between Algerian and foreign 
stakeholders. In general, however, it seems to be the case that such domestic concerns exist throughout 
all groups of actors in Algeria.  
On the whole, the positions of different influential stakeholders within Algeria are diverging; hence, a 
coherent Algerian position towards powerful foreign stakeholders, e.g. the EU, is not yet in sight. 
The yet unclear legal conditions regarding foreign investments represent a major obstacle for the 
future integration of Algeria into a transcontinental renewable energy grid.  
The question whether the legal constraint for direct export projects (with a separate transmission 
infrastructure, built by the exporting IPP) could be removed by an amendment of the electricity law in 
the future remains currently unclear, and has to-date not been the subject of discussions.  
6.2. Generalised Matrix for Analysis 
Transcontinental electricity export is a big technical and technological challenge. However, taking the 
current technological status into consideration, these challenges seem solvable: The necessary  
technologies are already available: wind, photovoltaic and solar thermal power plants, as well as 
HVDC power lines. Costs are expected to decrease soon, thanks to economies of scale. As has been 
shown by DLR (2005, 2006, 2009), these results – concerning technological feasibility and economic 
costs – as well as life cycle costs and external costs, can be generalised to some extent for a large 
number of countries. For instance, economic costs of solar thermal power plants, wind turbines and 
PV plants will be roughly at the same level in Algeria as in Egypt or Morocco. Therefore, these 
criteria can be assessed independently of the country.  
Other criteria need to be evaluated on a country-specific basis; these are mainly so-called soft criteria 
that do not involve “hard” technologies. These factors, however, are crucial for the overall feasibility 
of a transcontinental electricity grid. 
Such general criteria are: 
• Political frameworks of countries, including strategies and roadmaps 
• Stakeholders’ positions and influence, covering the broad scope of societal actors 
The current project analysed these two general sets of criteria for the Algerian case. The major goal 
was to find out about the existing frameworks and stakeholders in the southern and eastern 
Mediterranean region regarding a future transcontinental renewable electricity grid with Europe. 
These structures and actors can be catalysers, barriers or neutral, i.e. neither facilitating nor slowing 
down developments. 
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For these criteria a matrix has been established that provides a consistent algorithm for the analysis of 
other countries in the mentioned region (see Tab. 6-1 and Tab. 6-2). Using that matrix, it will be 
possible to generate a consistent “landscape” of frameworks and stakeholders concerning future 
renewable electricity exports that could serve as a basis for transcontinental cooperation. 
Tab. 6-1. Matrix for the analysis of legal frameworks in countries. 
Analysis of legal frameworks 
Current legal framework in the electricity sector and consequences for electricity 
export 
Types of laws 
Shape of electricity sector (state-owned, status of privatisation) 
Current legal framework for renewable energies, focusing on the electricity sector 
Legislative provisions for renewable energies: Feed-in tariffs, other instruments and measures 
Investment policy – general situation and focusing on renewable energies 
Status of foreign investments 
Status of domestic investors 
Taxation issues and export duties 
Land rights and ownership issues 
 
Tab. 6-2. Matrix for the analysis of actors and stakeholders and of existing discourses in countries. 
Analysis of relevant actors and stakeholders 
Discourses touching renewable energy issues existing in the analysed country 
Different types of discourses existing in the analysed country 
Example: Case study Algeria: 
The nationalist discourse 
The utilitarian discourse 
The ecological and civil society discourse, including the role of the media 
The business discourse 
Localisation of the renewable energy export debate within existing discourses 
Selection from discourses described before 
Localisation of existing relevant actors and stakeholders within these discourses, 
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position towards renewable energy exports 
Deduction of results from analysis of discourses and stakeholders 
 
6.3. General Aspects to Be Considered During Future Analyses 
From a European point of view, cooperation with actors in the Southern Mediterranean and scientific 
work there poses various challenges. Some result from intercultural conditions, some from the nature 
of the analysed topics themselves. In some countries, the topic of renewable electricity export schemes 
is considered politically sensitive as it touches upon national interests and is sometimes even 
perceived as a matter of national security. This has various consequences for scientific work. In 
general, the ambiance of scientific discussion is often not as open as it could be to gain a maximum of 
information. The central question regarding the general situation is therefore: How openly are matters 
of national interest discussed in the respective countries?  
According to our experience, the general willingness to discuss is in some cases rather limited, as 
renewable electricity export schemes are considered somewhat sensitive, for Algerian governmental 
stakeholders have not adopted a final stance on them and are not willing to communicate an unofficial 
position. This directly leads to the problem that some actors were not ready to share their points of 
view with the project team. Other stakeholders were open for discussion, but did not want to be quoted 
by names. 
6.4. Open Questions and Further Need for Research  
The project revealed numerous questions and challenges that need to be solved before a country like 
Algeria will be able to participate in a transcontinental renewable electricity grid. The current focus on 
technological challenges among European actors distracts attention from non-technological aspects. 
There is significant need for further research in the fields of a) socio-economic impacts of a 
transcontinental renewable energy grid and b) policy formulation. 
Research is necessary on different levels: 
• Basic research regarding general options for the implementation of renewable energy 
technologies applying principles of sustainability 
• Action research during immediate project implementation in terms of environmental non-
degradation etc. 
• Development of strategies and roadmaps on a country and regional level 
• Research in the field of policies and legal frameworks 
• Macro-economic benefits of a transcontinental electricity grid for Southern Mediterranean 
countries 
In the field of basic research, as mentioned above, a lot of progress has been made. Sustainability has 
been accepted as a major guiding principle in societies and for technical systems. However, there are 
still branches that lag behind, and many countries are even rejecting responsibility for a more 
sustainable development of their economies. In the Mediterranean region, the concept of sustainability 
is starting to gain momentum on the political level, and a few countries are even trying to reconcile 
this approach with their traditional growth patterns.  
Action research during immediate project implementation covers environmental aspects and direct 
impact on humans in various ways. Life-cycle-assessment is one of several instruments to be applied. 
The development of strategies is of utmost importance in two directions: On the one hand, strategies 
for domestic energy supply need to be developed. On the other hand, as domestic energy systems are 
increasingly interacting with other systems via transborder connections (the most prominent currently 
being a EUMENA power grid for renewable electricity), strategies for such transnational cooperation 
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need to be devised. These potentially conflicting dimensions need to be reconciled to generate the best 
possible synergies in the mid to long term. Such strategies are not only necessary for energy system 
development, but also for networks in research and development, for economic cooperation and for 
the development of North African and European stakeholders.  
Effective policies and legal frameworks are lacking in Algeria as well as in other southern 
Mediterranean countries. However, without reliable and effective administrative frameworks, no 
markets for renewable energies will develop. The transfer of policies and other frameworks from 
experienced countries to countries without significant experience and without appropriate industrial 
and other structures has failed in many cases. There is no “one type fits all” framework. Therefore, 
national frameworks need to be developed, taking national specifics closely into consideration. Such 
expertise is lacking in many Mediterranean countries.  
Last but not least, macro-economic benefits of renewable energies and especially of a 
transcontinental renewable energy grid and cooperation are far from being fully recognised. This is 
especially true when it comes to a stakeholder-specific perspective. Central questions in this respect 
are: Which benefits can North African and the eastern Mediterranean region gain for their own 
economic and social development? Which steering functions do governments have to fulfil in order to 
realise these gains? 
 
In sum, the following statements on open questions and further need for research can be made: 
• Sustainability is currently not accounted for in energy system development in Mediterranean 
countries. There is a need for basic research in this field 
• Currently, no research is carried out during project implementation. This would be relevant in 
terms of environmental protection standards and other local impacts 
• There is a lack of appropriate policies and other frameworks (legal, social) for the promotion 
of renewable energies and for the attraction of foreign funding for the establishment of a 
transcontinental renewable electricity grid. Furthermore, there is also a lack of expertise for 
policy formulation in the mentioned countries. Thus, this is a major field for capacity building 
measures. 
• Roadmaps and strategies need to be developed, covering national as well as transnational 
aspects. Such roadmaps will only be successful by combining these domestic and international 
dimensions. 
• Macroeconomic costs and benefits of a transcontinental electricity grid for southern 
Mediterranean countries need to be fully assessed and communicated accordingly among 
national decision makers and other stakeholders. 
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8. Annex - Executive orders (decrees) related to different energy laws   
The concerned laws are: 
• The law on energy efficiency (Loi n° 99-09 du 28 juillet 1999 portant sur la maîtrise de 
l’énergie) 
• The electricity law (Loi  n° 02-01 du 5 février 2002 portant sur l’électricité et la distribution 
du gaz par canalisation) 
• The renewable energy law (Loi n°04-09 du 14 août 2004 portant sur la promotion des 
énergies renouvelables dans le cadre du développement durable) 
 
 
Décrets d’application 
1 Décret exécutif n° 05-16 du Aouel Dhou El Hidja 1425 correspondant au 
11 janvier 2005 fixant les règles spécifiques d’efficacité énergétique 
applicables aux appareils fonctionnant à l’électricité, aux gaz et aux 
produits pétroliers (JO n° 5 du 12 janvier 2005). 
2 Décret exécutif n° 05-16 du Aouel Dhou El Hidja 1425 correspondant au 
11 janvier 2005 fixant les règles spécifiques d’efficacité énergétique 
applicables aux appareils fonctionnant à l’électricité, aux gaz et aux 
produits pétroliers (JO n° 5 du 12 janvier 2005). 
 
 
 
Loi n°  99-09 du 28 juillet 
1999  portant sur la maîtrise 
de l’énergie 
3 Décret exécutif n° 2000-90 du 19 Moharram 1421 correspondant au 24 
avril 2000 portant réglementation thermique dans les bâtiments neufs 
(JO n° 25 du 30 avril 2000). 
Décrets d’application 
1 Décret exécutif n° 08-114 du 3 Rabie Ethani 1429 correspondant au 9 
avril 2008 fixant les modalités d’attribution et de retrait de concessions 
de distribution de l’électricité et du gaz et le cahier des charges relatif 
aux droits et obligations du concessionnaire 
2 Décret exécutif n° 07-310 du 25 Ramadhan 1428 correspondant a 7 
octobre 2007 fixant le niveau de consommation annuelle en électricité et 
en gaz du client éligible et les conditions de retour du client éligible au 
système à tarifs (JO n° 64 du 10 octobre 2007). 
3 Décret exécutif n° 07-293 du 14 Ramadhan 1428 correspondant au 26 
septembre 2007 fixant les modalités d’alimentation et d’accès des tiers 
aux réseaux de transport et de distribution de l’électricité et du gaz (JO 
n° 62 du 3 octobre 2007). 
4 Décret exécutif n° 06-432 du 5 Dhou El Kaada 1427 correspondant au 26 
novembre 2006 fixant cahier des charges relatif aux droits et obligations 
du gestionnaire du réseau de transport du gaz (JO n° 76 du 29 novembre 
2006). 
5 Décret exécutif n° 06-430 du 5 Dhou El Kaada 1427 correspondant au 26 
novembre 2006 fixant les règles techniques de conception, d’exploitation 
et d’entretien du réseau de transport de l’électricité (JO n° 76 du 29 
novembre 2006).  
6 Décret exécutif n° 06-429 du 5 Dhou El Kaada 1427 correspondant au 26 
novembre 2006 fixant le cahier des charges relatif aux droits et 
obligations du producteur d’électricité (JO n° 76 du 29 novembre 2006). 
 
 
 
Loi  n° 02-01 du 05 
/02 /2002 portant sur 
l’électricité et la distribution 
du gaz par canalisation 
7 Décret exécutif n° 06-428 du 5 Dhou El Kaada 1427 correspondant au 26 
novembre 2006 fixant la procédure d’octroi des autorisations d’exploiter 
des installations de production de l’électricité (JO n° 76 du 29 novembre 
2006). 
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8 Décret exécutif n° 05-182 du 9 Rabie Ethani 1426 correspondant au 18 
mai 2005 relatif à la régulation des tarifs et à la rémunération des 
activités de transport, de distribution et de commercialisation de 
l’électricité et du gaz (JO n° 36 du 22 mai 2005). 
9 Décret exécutif n° 04-92 du 4 Safar 1425 correspondant au 25 mars 2004 
relatif aux coûts de diversification de la production d’électricité (JO n° 
19 du 28 mars 2004). 
10 Décret exécutif n°7-294 du 26 septembre 2007 fixant les modalités 
d’alimentation et d’accès des tires au réseau de transport et de 
distribution de l’électricité et du gaz 
11 Décret exécutif n° 02-194 du 15 Rabie El Aouel 1423 correspondant au 
28 mai 2002 portant cahier des charges relatif aux conditions de 
fourniture de l’électricité et du gaz par canalisations (JO n° 39 du 2 juin 
2002). 
12 Arrêté du 14 Safar 1429 correspondant au 21 février 2008 fixant les 
règles techniques de raccordement au réseau de transport de l’électricité 
et les règles de conduite du système électrique (JO n° 25 du 18 mai 
2008) 
13 Arrêté du 14 Rabie El Aouel 1428 correspondant au 2 avril 2007 fixant 
la procédure de déclaration des installations de production de l’électricité 
(JO n° 36 du 3 juillet 2007). 
 
14 MEM. Décision n°63 du 10 mi 2008, de Monsieur le ministre de 
l’énergie et des mines portant mise en place, pour une période transitoire, 
du comité de concertation sur les investissements dans les secteurs de 
l’électricité et de la distribution du gaz par canalisation 
Décrets d’application 
1 Décret exécutif n°2007-207 du 30 juin 2007 réglementant l’usage des 
substances qui appauvrissent la couche d’ozone, de leur mélange et des 
produits qui en contiennent      
2 Décret exécutif 2007-300 du 27 septembre 2007 fixant les modalités 
d’application de la taxe complémentaire sur les eaux usées industrielles. 
3 Décret exécutif 2007-206 du 30 juin 2007 fixant les conditions et les 
modalités de construction et d’occupation du sol sur  la bande littorale, 
de l’occupation des parties naturelles bordant les plages et de l’extension 
de la zone objet de non-aedificandi 
 
 
 
 
Loi n° 04-09 du 14 août 
2004 portant sur la 
promotion des énergies 
renouvelables dans le cadre 
du développement durable* 
 
4 Décret exécutif n°205-443 du 14 novembre 2005 fixant les modalités de 
coordination, le champ d’application et le contenu des schémas 
directeurs sectoriels des grandes infrastructures et de services collectifs 
d’intérêt national ainsi que les règles de procédures qui leur sont 
applicables  
*50 décrets à ce jour ont été répertoriés 
 
